Horse Fishing v Attorney-General & Minister of Justice (CIV.APP.71/17) [2018] SLHC 1272 (20 April 2018);
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON THE 20TH APRIL, 2018 BY THE HON. MR JUSTICE SENGU M KOROMA JA
- The Respondent in this appeal, the Attorney-General and Minist er of Justice is the principal Legal Adviser to the Government of Sierra Leone, the Lessor of all that state land and premises situate, lying and being at Jui Hastings, Greater Freetown in Western Area of the Republic of Sierra Leone. The said land was by indenture of a lease and
supplemental lease dated the 20th October, 2003 registered as No.
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15 0 / 20 0 3 at page 11 volume 96 and 9th December, 2014 registered as
No. 24 1 / 2 0 14 at page 106 in volun;ie p2 respectively of the Book of
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Leases kept in the office of the Reg..strar-G. ..e. neral, Freetown (hereinafter referred to as the' Lease') to the.. ppellant herein, Horse Fishing
Company for a term of 50 (fifcy}y e; ···upon the terms and conditions
stated therein.
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By a Writ of Summons dat d the 17h day of J une, 2016, the Respondent instituted proceedin_.gs aga°lnst the Appellant seeking the following relief:
i. An Orde for immedj te posi ssion of the premises situate lying and
bein_g at Jui" Hc1sti ng.s:, Greater Freetown in the Western Area aforesaid
as th-·: i ' ase pr! viously held by the Respondent has been forfeited but
. cb=bti _ues t· hold a· d occupy the said premises.
11.. Ano } d r . or the cancellation of any other interest in the aforesaid
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111.
IV.
V.
pren:uses
Da : ai es for breach of contract
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Any other or further Orders that this Court may deem fit Cost
- The Respondent in its defence did not admit that the Plaintiff was entitled to possession of the said land and premises and averred that the
Government through the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment were only entitled to the reversionary interest as Lessors.
- The Appellant admitted that the Appellant correctly described the premises in its particulars of claim and averred that in breach of the Principal and Supplemental Leases described above, the Respondent proceeded to lease the said premises to a third party notwithstanding the subsistence of lease Agreement between the Appellant and the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment representing the Governmentof Sierra Leone.
4 The Appellant denied having breached cJause 2 (x) of the Principal
Lease or failed to comply with the covenant to repair, cleanse, uphold,
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maintain or keep in good and tenantable repair, the buildings and structures
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on the demised premises.
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- In view of the aforesaid.,the Appellant counterclaimed as follows:
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- Damages for breach of contr.act
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11. Damages for wr9ngful ipte rlehincewith quiet enjoyment of demises
premises. _:(
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111. A decl ratidri) at the.Principal and Supplemental lease Agreements dated 2ist October 20{3 and 9th September, 2014 respectively be held to b \,alid and subsi ting until its expiration.
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- I·n: } plyto the Defence, the Respondent contended that by virtue of
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Clause 4 (1) of the Lease Agreement, it had the right to re-enter and reposesss
the demised premises in the event of a breach of any of the covenants contained in the said lease, which was the case in this instance as the Defendant had breached both clauses 2 (iii) and 2 (x).
- It also contended that the Appellant sublet the prem1ses without obtaining the required consent; the fact that the lease was terminated four months after it was signed was irrelevant.
- The Respondent contended that the Appellant failed to develop the premises.
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- . In the reply to counterclaim, the Respondent denied breaching any
covenant and contended that the Appellant breached fundamental covenants in the lease Agreement.
- It averred that the Lease Agreement was void ab initio as it did not comply with Section 4 (1) of the citizens (Interest in Land) Act, 1966.
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- The Appellant filed and is_sued a Judge's Summons dated 10th July, 2017
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praying the High Court to grant the:::Orde s prayed for in the counterclaim.
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The Respondent filed an Affidavit .i:i:i O:pp9sit6ionto the said application sworn
to by Precious V. K Few.ry: 6n
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th·e; · i : dayof July, 2017. This was followed by a
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Supplemental a da\it sw: n f 'io:9. n the 7th September, 2017. Exhibited to the
said Supple!J?.enta.l ffidavi was a letter of offer leasing a portion of the
premises to ,t 3'rd party·,SABCO FISHING COMPANY.
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- T_he J:: i e's summons was moved on the 20th July, 2017 and responded to
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on theist A gust, 2017.
- In her Judgment dated 12th September, 2017, the Learned Trial Judge, Hon. Justice A Wright J. made the following findings:
- The Plaintiff/Respondent's conduct in its entirety in all the transactions with the parties, i.e the Plaintiff/Respondents and SABCO Fishing Company was unprofessional, haphazard, disjointed and conducted with
reckless disregard for the nature of the Defendant/Applicant's business and operations. The remedies employed to the perceived breaches of the lease agreement and their timing were not only unlawful but not practical and only served to complicate all the respective parties even further, two wrongs did not make right.
- The Lease Agreement dated 21st October, 2003 and the Supplemental Lease dated 9th December, 2014 respectively are void ab initio and thus not valid in law by the negligence of both the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Administrator General
- The Plaintiff/Respondent has to some extend interfered with the
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Defendant/Respondent's quiet enjoyment of the demised pr mises whose Employee/Management became involved in co frontation with the Defendant/Applicant. Furthermore, Jhe purported termination of the lease
and the subsequent withdrawal a1}t i ryed t; confuse, scare and to some
extend paralyse the Defendant/ Appli: t from continuing with its fishing
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operations and further investments as per its operational plan for 2017
which was prepared and submitted to the Ministry of Lands at their
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request. · --::··:·\
- The 3rd par,ty
S·. ABc ·o ·. whifh::the Plaintiff/Respondent offered a lease of
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portion of the demised premises was a bona fide or innocent purchaser for val_ue. I.:-: ; the ligh( of the lease, the party has also engaged in a not
insi:ghificant·i vest { t on the portion of the demised premises but is yet
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to e ecute a lease Agreement with the Plaintiff/Respondent; this, its own
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legal ip.terest on the demised premises is also questionable as it has only
complied\vith certain terms and conditions of the offer letter.
Based on these findings, the Learned Trial Judge Ordered as follows:
- The Defendant/Applicant shall be granted a new Lease Agreement by the Plaintiff/Respondent (at its own cost as damages for the wrongful interference with the quiet enjoyment of the demised premises) from the date of this Order for the maximum statutorily required term and an option if it so desires at a rent in line with the
reviews that were provided for in the Lease Agreement dated 20th October 2003, the demised premises in the Lease Agreement shall be clearly demarcated by the Ministry of Lands and the Defendant/Applicant shall immediately erect a concrete wall on its boundaries.
- The Plaintiff/Respondent shall ensure the full compliance of the
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terms and conditions of the offer letter to SABO Fishing Company
dated 12th October 2016, including the clear demarcation of the Land area to be granted and Sabco shall, with immediate effect construct a concrete wall between its operating area and the Defendant/Applicant's area and estabJish a new and different Exit and Entrance to its operating ea, different from the existing
entrance and gates of the D fendant/Applicant.
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- The Defendant / Applicant sli.'all have full and unfettered access to
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the Jetties at the J:ui_· Fishing Complex and shall work out a
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timetable of operati9ns .tl:l SabcoFishing Company on its usage of
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the said Jetties::.·:: . ··\ -.:-
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- The Ministry of lands shalJ..carry out regular inspection/monitoring
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of the Ju·i··Fishing··c·qmpiex (including the Jetties) that shall be
demi.sedJ o both' tjle Defendant/Applicant Sabco Fishing Company
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and::··s haU involv/ethe Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
=t.:,: for i.t·s Jxpertise: Whenever so required.
. -.=:·t:J. 5. E ch pariy shall bear its costs.
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< >0 1{ the 18th September, 2017, the Appellant filed noticev•:.•.
appointing C.F. Margai & Associates as Solicitors in place of Tejan-Cole, Yillah
& Bangura.
< >Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Trial Judge, the Appellant appealed to this Court against the whole decision on the following grounds:
- The Judge having correctly evaluated the evidence in favour of the Defendan't/Applicant erred in law in her findings and Orders which are at variance with the evaluation of the evidence aforesaid.
Particulars
- Page 3 under Judge's consideration and ruling paragraph 4: the Plaintiff/Respondent wrote to the Defendants solicitor on 16th June,
2016... In my mind the Plaintiff/Respondent should have come to the
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Court to obtain the necessary orders by proving the several breaches it was claiming.
Paragraph 5: The Plaintiff/Respondent proceeded to offer a leasehold interest to a third party (another fishing company6 SABCO Fishing Company)... A letter from the Plaintiff dated 11/2016 confirmed this conduct ..;_:.- , .....: ..
- Page 4 paragraph 1: howeve,rthe··Plaintiff/Respondent in 2007 wrote
another letter to the Defenda t/ Applicant. If the Plaintiff/Respondent
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claims to have the right of re-entry and forfeiture of the lease, why then was it requesting an action plan··from the Defendant/ Applicant on its
operations on thE;de ised ;p
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iiij_se::s d aimingdiplomatic intervention?
Paragraph 2: The...questfons in my mind are ... are the principal and
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supplem ntal leases void in law, thus cannot be valid?
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Paragra.p: :h3: The .Plaintiff/ Respondent in its affidavit in opposition of 28th
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July, 2di.7... I have not been able to come across any clause whatsoever therein that can be.. considered as a clause to sublease the demised premise.
Paragraphs 4,5,6 and 7 refers
(b) Page 5 -Paragraph 1: it thus follows therefore that the Plaintiff/Respondent had no right whatever to lease a portion of the demised premises to a third party ... And SABCO Fishing Company does not seen to have as valid lease agreement.
- The Judge should in law have discountenance the Affidavit in Opposition sworn to by Precious V.K. Fewry at Freetown on the 28th July, 2017 together with the exhibits attached thereto as well as the Supplemental Affidavit in Opposition sworn to and filed by Precious
V.K. Fewry at Freetown on the 7th day of September, 2017 as deponent and Solicitor for the Plaintiff on the grounds that both Affidavits contravene Order 59 of.the High Court Rules C.1. No. 8 of 2007 which when juxtaposed with exhibit SES1 Writ of Summons dated 17th June, 2016 FfCC 170/ 2016 No. 49 issued by Osman I. Kanu, Principal State Counsel, as Solicitor for the Plaintiff, in the absence of a Notice of Change of Solicitor.
- The title the Attorney-General & Minister of Justice as Plaintiff in the
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said proceedings is unsupported in law, considering that the office is a
creature of statute with prescribeJ}'. unc.ti · .
- The Learned Judge having_;-fqµnl in paragraph 1 of page 5 that the
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Plaintiff/Respondent no rig4ftolease a portion of the premises to a
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third party, even if the Def ndant had breach the covenant of the lease
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agreement, the Learr{ d Judge'. rredin law in not setting aside the said
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lease as well as·-:·o cleririg·j ts expunction from the Deed of Leases
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registered in the office..of the Registrar and Administrator-General and by.exte'nsion,orderirig the third party, i.e. SABCO Fishing Company to
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forthwith hand o er possession of the portion of the premises
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. purpo: dly leased by the Plaintiff/ Respondent to them; this the
LEiar ed Judge failed to do.
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::, >. Particulars
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(a) Page·5 1: it thus follows therefore that the Plaintiff/Respondent had no right whatsoever to lease a portion of the demised premises to a third party... The Defendant/Applicant's lease may be void and SABCO Fishing Company does not seen to have a valid lease agreement.
- In consequence, the Appellant sought the following relief:
- That the findings and Orders be set aside and one in favour of the Defendant/Applicant be substituted therefore,
- Such other or further reliefs to be granted to meet the Justice of the case &
- Costs
I have listened to my Lord Taylor-Kamara and agree with his narration of
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events. I shall now therefore proceed to deal with t..he grounds of appeal.
- Despite these rather detailed ground pf appeal, the issues to be
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determined by this Court can be summarise .as follows: =·
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Whether the Trial Judge was right in arrivine at her findings and
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making the Orders thereof in.Jl light 0f:th evidence adduced.
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- Was the Learned Judge correct' in law to Order the Respondent to
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ensure full complian - 9f th· Terms and conditions of the offer letter to
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SABCO Fi_hing CoTI}pany dated the 12th October, 2016 including the
clear em; ; c1ti on }\:he land area to be granted and SABCO Fishing
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Cqmpariy shall"with #nmediate effect construct a concrete wall between
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. its operating area and the Appellant's area and create a new and
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·" ·..4Jfferent exit and Entrance to its operating area, different from the
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exi tjng entrance and gates to the Appellant.
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- In an;wer to the first question, I shall enquire whether there is any available evidence upon which the Trial Judge could have relied on the in concluding that the Lease Agreements dated 21st October, 2003 and the Supplemental Lease dated 9th December, 2013 respectively are void ab initio and thus not valid in law by the negligence of both the
Respondent and the Administrator General. The reason for this enquiry is that if this was the correct position of the law, then it would justify the Order made in favour of SABCO. Subject to the fact to the fact that the said SABCO was neither a party in the court below nor in this court.
- In his synopsis, Osman I. Kanu Esq. Counsel for the Respondent argued that the Appellant had breached clause 2 (x), a fundan:iental clause of the Principal Lease agreement which provides for the Appellant not to sublet or part with possession or occupation of the premise·s demisedor any part thereof without the written consent of the land lord, such
consent should not be unreasonably withheld, and clause 2 (iii) which
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require the Appellant to at times during the said term of the lease to
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repair, uphold, maintain and keel? in tehantable repairs the buildings and structures of the demised pr :fuises. He submitted that due to the
breaches, the Respondent
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with clause 4 (i) of the principal
Lease, the Respondent re-ehtfred the vacant part of the demised
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premises and instituted cou,r. t proceedings to obtain possession of the un
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occupied part. \@}
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- Mr. Kap.u argued in the alternative that the lease Agreements were
void \; in t.io} 6 fai1di e to comply with Section 4(1) of the Non-citizens
(i te;rest i:d:: Land): ·A t, 1966 Act No. 30 of 1966 which provides that' No
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: npn-citizen s_hall purchase or receive in exchange or as a gift any
·; : i .seryed\ e-- ehold in the Western Area without obtaining first a licence
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from'tqe board.' On this point, Mr. Kanu relied on pages 6 and 7 of the
Judgm nt of Wright J . in which Her Ladyship stated as follows :" The above transaction and the resulting instrument is non-compliant on three levels, first, the required licence not obtained by the Defendant from the Board, secondly, the term of 50 (fifty) years granted when it should be twenty-one (21) years; thirdly, the fact that the Registrar General proceeded to register the resultant Lease Agreement without
ascertaining that all the requirements for non-citizen have been complied with."
- In his synopsis on the issue of subletting, C.F. Margai Esq. Counsel for the Appellant referred to page 44 of the Records and page 3 of the Judgment wherein the Trial Judge said as follows:-
- Paragraph 4 "...In my mind, the Plaintiff/Respondent should have come to court to obtain the necessary Orders by proving the several breaches it was claiming
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Page 245 of the Records and page 4 of the Ruling:
- Paragraph 1: However, the Plaintiff/Respondent in 2017 wrote another letter to the Deferid ni/ Applicant, requesting a 1 year Action plan from t·he =·= Defendant /Applicant. If the
Plaintiff / Respon dent: s:, ·:s: t··o· have the right of re-entry and
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forfeiture of th lease·, why· then was it requesting an action plan
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from the Defendant pp its'.:::9peration on the demised premises
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claimin, g q iplofu_ tic inteiyention
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- Paragraph6:: ;. The·:·Agnfoment in this instant case is called a
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cooperation contract "... nothing therein makes reference to sub-
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Leasing. The Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence whatsoever to
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its assertion that the Defendant indeed subleased the
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·,,-:;., ., 'd Il).is edpremises to a 3rd party.
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- .::.r have studied the arguments of both Couns el on this point and I
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agree with the Appellant that the Orders given by the the Trial Judge were at variance with the evidence. In particular, her Ladyship in her Judgment clearly stated that the relationship between the Appellant and Monza Fishing Company (the Company the Appellant purportedly sub leased to) was one of the cooperation contract and not sub-leasing. In her own words, "the Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence whatsoever
to back its assertion that the Defendant indeed subleased the demised premises to a third party". Her Ladyship continued on paragraph 7, page 246 of the Records "... in this instant case, the Defendant was not in breach of the covenant not to sublet the premises to a third party."
- It follows from the foregoing that the Trial Judge gave an
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improper Order for the Appellant to be granted a new Lease Agreement whilst the Lease and supplemental Lease Agreement dated 20th October, 2003 registered as No. 150/2003 at page 11 in volume 96 and 9th
December, 2014 registered as No. 241/2014 at page 106 in volume 112
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respectively of the Book of Leases kept in the office of the Registrar
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General was still subsisting save the istake in granting a term contrary
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to existing law: even this could b,e curedby rectification.
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- In any event, in the si :;; Leonea case of MACFOY -V- U.A.C
OF SIERRA LEON:E::: LIMI1J:pc} t 64-66)ALL. SL3, the Court of Appeal
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not.
held that a l ssee wh'cr.had cqyenanted not to part with possession of
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demised premises was in breach of that covenant where he merely
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permitted anqtper per$on to have use of the premises whilst he retained
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p9ssessiozj.,;..as a_l §ee. This was what happened in this case as in the
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wor s of the :T rial' J udge herself, the relationship between the Appellant
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·;:_._ d the::p rported sub-lessee was one of co-operation. I have not found
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ariy r _as·o- ..depart from that finding.
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- Having disposed of the complaint that the Appellant had sublet the premises without the consent of the Respondent, I shall now move on to the question of whether the Lease should be terminated on the ground of breach of the covenant to repairs etc . On this point the Trial Judge said that the length of time the Appellant has spent on the demised premises and the very significant quantum of investment the
Appellant has sunk into its operations on the demised premises is of paramount importance to this Court.
- In her words, 'the structures on the premises were old and required substantial investments to rehabilitate and maintain."
- Bairaman C.J defined the tenant's obligation to repair as being a duty to keep the premises wind and water tight but no duty to sustain and uphold the premises nor be responsible for natural wear and tear (JOHNSON -V- ZACHARIAH (1957-60)) ALR SL118. ()Referred to by Ade Renner Thomas in his book LAND TENURE IN SIERRA LEONE (PP. 96-97). The question is did the Respondent provide evidence to
prove that the Appellant has not kep{\ h, e·...premises in good order in
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accordance with the terms of tl}e aghfoment? No such evidence was provided. These were premises Ji 4 for fishing and related activities as
such businesses have their.<>\Yll p. eJ ti faritiesas regards sanitation etc.
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- On this point, Beok:u ·B tts. J. in JABER -V- JABER (1950-56)
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ALR S.L. 97 had thist··9:),·•s.ay.·: ·,·==L=..-..
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" Mate'ri l facts···to be taken into consideration in determining whether..the} as· be n at ; each of the covenant to repair are the locality,
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character of thi premis s ,"
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- ·= Th·e: o nly logical conclusion on this point would be that no evid ;ce has been provided to prove that the Appellant was in breach of the co hant to repair etc... Even if that had been the case, under the Conveyancy and Law of property Act 1881, the Respondent must have first served a notice on the Appellant specifying the particular breach complained of and requiring that it be remedied, if possible, ora reasonable compensation thereof. Section 14 of the Conveyancy and Law of Property Act, 1881 gives the Courts a wide discretion to grant relief
against forfeiture. This was the position in BASMA -V- NOURELDINE (1950-59) ALR SL234 where the Court exercised its discretion in favour of granting relief against forfeiture for breach of covenant to repair.
- As regards the Order of the Trial Judge regarding full compliance of the letter of offer to SABCO, I hold that she ought not to have granted that Order. Under page 51 paragraph 1 of the Judgment, the Trial Judge
after holding that the Appellant was not in breach of th_e covenant to
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sublet without written permission of the Respondent, as it did not sublet
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to a third party, went on to say "it thus follows therefore that, the
Plaintiff/Respondent had no right whatspev·erto lease a portion of the demised premises to a third party, even if the Defendant had breached the covenants of the lease agreement, the Plaintiff should have ensured that the Defendants were evicted from the demised premises before
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granting a lease of a porti_qn 9f th .d mised premises to a third party;
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the Plaintiff/Responde t's conduct can be construed as wrongful
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interference with fl?·.
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demised premises·.
D fe qa t/Applicant's quiet possession of the
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' .- J'he T. rial Judge notwithstanding this analysis
granted an Order in faJ ur of the third party SABCO on the ground that
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it was a.bona fide or innocent purchaser for value and they have engaged
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in a riot ins.igni qnit investment on the portion of the demised
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pre ises. I/ th respect, hold a contrary view for reasons I shall proffer
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- In t-h
<case of RONALD LISK CAREW -V- ALIMAMY SAMUEL
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BANGURA CIV.APP 39/2009, (unreported), the Court of Appeal set aside the Order by the Trial Judge granting title to a non-party.
- The Respondent in the instant case did not apply to the Court below to add SABCO as a party nor did it subsequently apply to amend his statement of claim. The Learned Trial Judge did not also sue moto
make either or all of such orders. These are the applicable conditions set out by Browne-Marke JSC in the case of RONALD LISK CAREW -V ALIMAMY SAMUEL BANGURA( ubi supra) which I adopt herein.
- Another justification given by Learned Trial Judge for giving an Order in favour of the 3rd party SABCO was that they were Bona fide or innocent purchaser for value. Accepting this justification would be
stretching the doctrine to breaking point. This doctrine also known as
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bona fide purchaser for value, good faith purchaser, innocent purchaser,
purchaser in good faith refers to a person who purchases for value without notice of any other party's claim against the property. It simply means one who purchases property _to/ a valuable consideration that is
an inducement for entering into:··a contract and without suspicion of
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being defrauded or deceived by tlie seller. He or she has no notice of any
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defects of the title. A bona:fide purchas r pays in good faith, the full
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value for the proper.ty and, witho?t any fraud goes into possession.
- SABCO is in th
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fishi g ._.Industry as is the Appellant. Both are
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competitors··a d kno.w bf each other. SABCO ought to have known that
the pre i: ....were l ased to the Appellant and that no Court had
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on;Iered·::'fprfeitrire of:- the leasehold interest. Before applying for the
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le·a
' SAB_CO, would have visited the premises which visit could have
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.r vealJ<:1.the d'ccupation of the land by the Appellant. They have legal dviser(·) \. ho should have informed them that due process had not
bee,.n fq}1owed in offering a portion of the premises to them. SABCO is
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clearly not an innocent purchaser and therefore not entitled to benefit
from that equitable remedy; for equity has an interest in and power over the purchaser's conscience.
- The Respondent argued in the alternative that the Lease was null and void as it failed to comply with Section 4 of the Non-Citizens
(Interests in Land) Act, 1966 I note that this aspect of the Respondent's argument was not pleaded in the Writ of Summons.
- Section 4 (1) provides that "no non-citizens shall purchase or receive in exchange or as a gift any reserved leaseholds in the Western Area without first obtaining a licence from the Board". In Section 2, Board means a Board consisting of the Ministers responsible for Trade and Industrial, Lands, Finance and the Atto rney-Gen. eral, of which the
Minister of Lands shall be the Chairman. The Trial Judge held.. that the Appellant as a non-native by not complying with the said provision have
rendered the Lease Agreements dated 21s t October, 2003 and the supplemental Lease dated 9th Decem_b e,r, 2014 respectively were void ab
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initio. I do not share that view. An agreement is void ab initio when it is
considered invalid from the tim··e=i f\ ,vqs written and/or signed (i.e. from
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the start of the contract). In. the instant case the correct procedure to be
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followed in the grant .:qf a lease was complied with - offer letter,
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payment of lease r nt and prep ration of the lease agreement. The
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difficultly arose when.no appliG tion was made to Board for a licence.
Even that qid; f \:tjqkJ \ h: :a_gi ement void as Section 5 of the said Act
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provides thaf"if sati"sn ed that the failure to observe the law was due to
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genuine and excusa?le mistake or ignorance (whether of the law or fact),
thJ: oard ?nay)" :: ··
,:
a) Permit the parties to annul the transaction or modify it in such a manner as may he approved by the Board and grant such licence as may be necessary in relation thereto; or
b}"'Cause the Sheriff to sell property by public auction ..."
< >In effect, such an agreement could at worst be voidable in the event that the Board chooses option (B).In any event, the events surrounding this transaction are akin to a dark comedy. Here the Appellant applied for a leasehold interest from the Minister of Lands, who gave it a letter of offer which he took to the
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Attorney-General for a Lease Agreement to be prepared. After preparing and registering the said Lease, the said Minister of Lands and the Attorney- General purported to terminate the lease on the ground that the lessee had not applied for a licence from a Board of which the Minist er of Lands is Chairman and the Attorney-General, a member. The Appellant is a Company having shareholders in Egypt and operating in Sierra Leone by virtue of a bilateral relationship etween the two countries. The Respondent ought to have advised Appellant on the procedure to be followed in the grant of a lease to a non-citjzen. This
was not done and the Minister of Lands th.. rough the Law Officer's Department later purported to terminate the lease on the ground of
non-conformity with the law. Given thfse facts, Section 5 (2) (a) should
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have applied. Allowing otherwise.would be tantamount to sanctioning official gangsterism. \ t -:. ·. ·:.··· .,·- :::
< >That the Administf ator-Gern· al registered the lease and·-:;_ .-,• · ·:::;:: :-. ... <:;: •,
supplemental lease withou·t r eference to the Section 6 (1) (a) of Act
would not make theih invalid a- \ gards the interest of the Appellant for
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the maxim Omnia pr fes umufur.et solemter rite esse acta shall apply.
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< >I ha.y. e read Ju·-: stice ynn's draft opinion and also that of Justice
SE.NGU M. KOROMA JA
RULING SMK/CK I 17