WRIGHT J.S.C. - This is an  appeal  from  the judgment  of  the  Court  of  Appeal  dated  1he 29 th   day  of June  2004.          The respondent had issued a writ claiming possession for the  recovery of the premises situate at 27 Pultney Street,  Freetown  on  the  '.' th  August  2U'!-' during   the  long  vacation,  An appearance was entered but no defence was filed !'he· respondent then applied for leave to enter a summary judgment in the High C'oun.

 

There was an appeal to the Court of Appeal that the High Court Judge was wrrn1g 1:1 granting leave to sign summary judgment based on the ground that the  appellant  had  a  good defence and that there were triable issues. There  were  several  grounds  of  appeal  as  to  whether  summary Judgement  have the  court   when  several   triable  issues  have  been   raised   before  the  Court   and  the appellant had a good defence. The Court of Appeal based their judgment on the merits of the case and it  was  a  case  for  leave  to  grant  a  summary  judgment.    As  a  result  the  Court dismissed the Appeal

 

 

E..E. Shears-:Moses counsel for the appellant together..._He stated that the appeal was not about the substance  of the act1un  but  that 1 1 was  not  a proper case  for summary Judgment  pursuant  to Order  X l  of  the  High   CcJ111:

Rules.   He pointed  out  the  triable  issues in  this matter Charles  Margai  Esq.  also Cuunscl

tor the appellant stated that the identity of the property was not in dispute but that 111 ti1c atfalav1t in opposition the appellant said that she had paid rent in full but that  the recctph were burnt.

 

:\. F Serry-Kamal Esq. Counsel for the respondent  stated  that  the property 111  dhputc :., 2" Pultney Street and not 26 Pultney Street  Frceto\\11  Therefore the ans"er  must  be th.,, they are not one and the same property.  He said  that  the court  of Appeal  right!,  e\erci,e,1 its discretion in granting the judgment since there was no triable defence.

 

What are the issues involved in this case''  The property in dispute 1 2 Pultney S,rec! but  the  letter  exhibited  as  AC2  to  the affidavit   1s  for 26  Pultney  Street.   Cuunsel  :°u;  :1 ,c appellant  contended that the property   was not in dispute since both sides known  property, but Counsel for the respondent  said  that  they  were  not  the  same  prupc,·•.:• fherc was no evidence to show that rent was paid to Alhaji S.A. Kornrna or that  the  purported document was signed by him.

From the documents tendered the premises were let by Alhaji S.A. Koroma .,, Cha1rrnan!Leader of  the  A.P.C.   According  to  the  respondent  the  tenancv  cxpi1·ed  'August  2001, and  the appellant continued  to live on the premises al°tcr  the cxp11'.  ,,;

the ;1torcsa1d :1grccment. The proccedmgs to evict the appellant were co1nrnc11ced Jg,u11< her because she did not vacate 27 Pultney Street despite several dcm:111us ,in t11,· 11

.-'.ugust 2001.

 

Does the appellant hai·e any triable defence/ The respondent was askrng t,,r po,scssi,,:: of the premises at 27 Pultney Street, Freetown. The appellant Ill her af!1davi1 s111l11i ,;:. the 2 I''  August 2002 exhibited a letter marked AC2 by the then A.P.C l'h,w111:c11 ,\ih.,"

S.A.T. Koroma stating that her tenancy was  to  be  until  the 31"  Dccen1hcr  211111  , !,_ nouce gi1-en  to her  to vacate within 21 days from the 24 th  July 2002  was to  the c,rntrc11,

!'here was thus a triable issue if the tenancy was still subsisting. Alhaj1 S..-\.T Ku,·c,:",'

11ever swore to an affidavit denying that he wrote Exhibit AC2.

 

Further to this, the notice to quit stated that the appellant was m breach 

llic ;tgrecment. The breach was that she was putting up a pern1anent structure \\·!11,:h '-.t':,·

 

 

Over and above that the appellant denied s1gnmg the purported lease :,grcc111cnt l·\L:11'

,\   FSK] 111  her  paragraphs  3-7.   I  hold  that  that  these  are  all  triabe  issues 111c l u,1111     "•­

put\lng up any structure as is even provided for in the lease agreement 111 pMagr.1p:1 : ,,. page 40 of the records.

 

I· agree to that, the agreement in dispute exhibited bv the Respondent agrees \I 1th,,,,.

 

 

 
 

letter of the 8th October 1998 in Exhibit ASK9 at page, 37 written by AlhaJ I F.B. Tura1

acknowledging the good work the Appellant was doing on  the  property  These  arc ali triable issues that vitiate against a summary judgment pursuant to Order 11 of the High

Court Rules I 960. Further evidence in support of the arguments that there are tnable issues 111 this matter is the letter of the 24 th July 2002 Jnarked. as Exhibit AC I at page 27. The Respondents were saying that the tenancy was weiipi,e on the 3 I st January 21JOJ which follows that at the time a notice to quit was served her tenm had not expired.

Let me now tum to Order 11 Rule  I  as  amended  by  Public  Notice  :',;o  24  or I %4 11h1ch states as follows -

 

 

"(u) Where The Defendant appears to a Writ of Summons spec,al/y indorsed wuh or

accompanied by u statemenr  of cluim  of the  remedy  or  relief to  which  rhe  plainnff  c/,l/111s to hi' l'nlilled under Order iii  Rule  6. the  Plcunt,jfmay  on  affidavit  made  by  lumselj  or  in uny  orher  person   who  can  swear  positively  to  the  facts,  verifying  the  cause  of  acrwn um/

the amount claimed (if any liquidated  sum 1s  claimed)  and stating that in his  /Je/1ef rhere is no defence to the action except as to the amount of damages claimed if anr, applv lo u Judge for liberty lo enter judgment for such remedy or  relief  as  upon  the statemenl  of claim 1he Pla1n1iff may be entitled to. The Judge thereupon, unless the Defendant hy ciffidi!v1t, by his own viva voce evidence or otherwise shall satisfy him that he has a good defence to the action on the merit, or shall  disclose  such  facts  as  may  be  deemed sufjicienr lo enwled him to defend  the action  generally,  may  make an  order  empowffmf; the Plaintiff to en/er such judgment as m ay be just, having regard lo the narure oj the  remedr or relief claimed" The power of  the  court  to  grant  leave  to  emer  SL!lllman JLLdgment 1s given by order I I Rule I of the High Court Rules 1960 as amended

 

The object of the order  is to ensure  a speedy conclusion  of  the  matters  or cases where the  Plaintiff  can  establish  dearly that  the  defendant  has  no defence or  triable issues.This

,     draconian  power  of  the  court  in  preventing  the  defendant   from  putting  his  case  before 1hc

:  cour1 must  be LLscd  judiciously.   A judge must  be satisfied  that  there are no triable issues

. before exercising his discretion to grant leave to enter a summary judgment The judge is also obliged to examine the defence in detail to ensure that there are no triable issues..

 

This remedy given by this order is a stringent one which is a judgment given without  a rrial.  It  was the intention  when  the order  was framed that  the affidavit so required  must  be a condition precedent to the exercise of the power  conferred  by the order to grvc Judgment without a trial. Therefore if an affidavit foils to satisfy the reyuircmcnr ot lhc,t order because the deponent cannot swear positively to the  facts  thereon  stated  mav  produce on the minds of the Judge, who  hears the matter a strong impression  that  though  the affidavit is not one which satisfies the tenms of the order, it nevertheless indicates a  strong probability that the Plaintiff has a good cause.

 

However recently the English Courts have gone one step futher in their endeavour tu ensure a speedy conclusion of matters under this order in the spirit of what it is now

 

 

 

 
 

only known as tlic Woolf Reform. The test ts not that there should onil be ,1 tri,il1.,· tssue but that the defence should have a real prospect of success as cltsunct frunr .,

, fanciful prospect of success (See Swam vs Hillman and another reported 1n 1 All Ln l.111,I Reports 200 l Page 91 at Page 95 paragraph J)

j

It 1s therefore the duty of the judge tu examine the issues of Law and ,if facts r,11,c,I ,11:,!

detcr111111c whether the defendant has a good chance of success.

 

The Dtgcst 37 (3) para 3103  referred  to  the  Judg111c11t  of  Vaugh:rn  \\'1l!u111s  I  J Symon   &  Co   VS   Pal111cr's   Stores  (1903)   Ltd   (1912   IKB  439,106   LTl76,  C   Ai                                                                                     .\ conditton to be satisfied in the granting of a summary judgment  1s  that  there  must  he  ,I". affidavit bv the Plaintiff himself or by any other  person  who  can  swear  pos1t11 ch  I<>  :Ire facts 1crifr1ng the cause of action, and the amount  claimed  1f  ,my,  and  stating  that  ,,,  'rh belief there is no defence to the action"

 

The pos1t1011 in Law has  been  well  settled.  As a  general  rule  where  a defendant  sh,,11, by his affidavit that he has a reasonable  ground  for setting  up a  defence  he  ought 1u  l:.,1 c lea1e w Jefencl the claim brought by him. The court has to take into accou11t .1:1 ,,,,. circumstances of the case 111cluding triable issues  111  deciding  whether  leaVc  \o  dclc:'..!  ought  to  be g1l'en  (Sec Saw  vs.  Hakim  5 TL   RP   72  and  Jones  vs Stone ( 1894 J ,\(                                                                              !.'cl The case of Jones 1s Stone sec above laiu down  the  rule  that  where  there  arc qucsuo11,  ,11 1·acts 111 disputes. summary judgment ought not  to  be  given  under  order  1-l  cqu11.1:c,,: Order I I of the High Court Rules. Sec also Ofodote vs Central Insurance Co 1 1 i '''i. ,

G LR .'U7 I

 

.See  also  the case of  Shcpparcls &  Co  vs.  Wilkinson  :rnJ  Jarvis (l88'J)  (i  TL   R.  IJ   l  .. \   ,:,

which  11  1,ud  down  that  "Summary  Judgment  confened  by  this  orde1 111ust  be  used  ,., ::t.

,·are.. -\ defenclant ought 11ot to be shut out from defending unless it 1s vcrv ct car ,,:,,\c·:,. that  he has 110  case in the action under discussion.  Thus where a defendant  h:1s  Ii kd                                                                                    ., defence which discloses a triable defence, 1t will be a travesty of Justice fur ., co1111 1,, rc!'use !urn leave to Jcfr11d simply because he had 11ot filed an affidavit 111 ''i'P"Slill'i rcspo11d111g to the fact  set out already  in  his defence.  In Jacobs  vs. Booths  D:s',li kt, Co I I 1JO I) 85 L T262)

1t 11as stated that Judgment should only be ordercu under summary Judg111c111 '.1:1,·:,· assurrnng all the facts are in favour of the defendants. they clo  not  amou11t  10  a  dctc1kc  i:: law.

 

In \\eil1ng1011 V \lutual Society( (1880) 5AC 685 at pC!gc 690.) A dcic11cl,111t "!1,1: ::,,,

.1 r::,1blc dctcnce shall ha1e a right to have his case med. The Justices ui tile 1 "''1:

,\ppeal \\1th respect should not have g,mc mto the substance  of  the  11c\1u11  h,,t  .1,  ',,,  whether ,,r not it was a  proper  case  for  summary  Judgment  to  bi:  gra111i:d  pursuant  11, Order   XI   o!'  tl1e   High   Court   Rules.     It   appears   that   the  learned   Justices   ul .\ppc•.,;

.1ck11owlcdged  that  there  was  a  defence  in  their  judgment  even  thnugh  later  :hc1 ,.,,,:

there \\ as no Jd'cncc.

 

 

Let me emphasize that summary judgment under Order 11 of the high Court Rules \ 960

should not be given during the vacation unless both parties consent to 1he order sec

\!acfoy vs. United Africa Co. Ltd. (1960 AC. House of Lords page 157) where Lord Denning dealt with the effect of delivering a statement of claim in the long vacation.

 

The learned Justices of the Court of Appeal should not have  gone  into  the  substantive matter and also not to have upheld the judgment since there were triable issues.

 

Urcler 11 R.ule b of the High Court Rules 1960 states "Leave to defend may be :iven unconditionally, or subject to such terms as to giving security or time or mode uf tna: or otherwise as the court may think fit".

 

In detennining whether leave is unconditional  or  conditional  the  judge  could  examine nther features surrounding the case such as good or bad faith of the parties, whether the conduct of any of the parties is questionable,  whether  the imposition  of  a condition  c,lllld he oppressive which could result in shutting out  the  defendant's  ability  to  defend  or proceed with the action. The foregoing examples are not exhaustive since circumstances

·n1,1v· differ from case to case.

 

!·or  the  reasons  given   above   the  judgment   of  the  Court  of  Appeal  dated   7 th  Apnl  2004

and the judgment of the  High Court dated 12th September 2002 are hereby set aside. The

,natter is remitted to the High Court and the appellant is given  leave to defencl  the r11atter  in the High Court.

 

!11 this case I Jo not sec any need for conditions to be imposed.

The respondent is to pay the taxed costs of this appeal and those or the Court below.