JUDGMENT DELIVERED ON THE 20TH APRIL, 2018 BY THE HON. MR JUSTICE SENGU M KOROMA JA

 

1. The Respondent in this appeal, the Attorney-General and Minist er of Justice is the principal Legal Adviser to the Government of Sierra Leone, the Lessor of all that state land and premises situate, lying and being at Jui Hastings, Greater Freetown in Western Area of the Republic of Sierra   Leone.   The  said   land   was   by  indenture   of  a  lease  and

supplemental  lease dated the 20th  October, 2003  registered  as  No.

:.

15 0 / 20 0 3 at page 11  volume 96  and 9th December, 2014 registered as

No. 24 1 / 2 0 14  at page 106 in volun;ie p2    respectively of the Book of

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Leases kept in the office of the Reg..strar-G. ..e. neral, Freetown (hereinafter referred  to  as the'  Lease')  to the.. ppellant  herein,  Horse Fishing

Company for a term of 50   (fifcy}y  e; ···upon the terms and conditions

 

stated therein.
 

·.              -· :··

 

By a Writ of Summons dat d the 17h day of J une, 2016, the Respondent instituted proceedin_.gs aga°lnst the Appellant seeking the following relief:

i.    An Orde  for immedj te  posi  ssion of the  premises  situate lying and

bein_g at Jui" Hc1sti ng.s:, Greater Freetown in the Western Area aforesaid

as th-·: i  ' ase pr! viously  held by the Respondent has been forfeited but

. cb=bti  _ues t·  hold a· d occupy the said premises.

11..      Ano }  d  r .  or the  cancellation  of any  other  interest  in the aforesaid

 

...     .
 

.     ::- ·.•

 

 

 

111.

 

IV.

 

V.
 

pren:uses

Da : ai es for breach of contract

·,·:

Any other or further Orders that this Court may deem fit Cost

 

1. The Respondent in its defence did not admit that the Plaintiff was entitled to possession of the said land and premises and averred that the

 

 

Government through the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment were only entitled to the reversionary interest as Lessors.

 

1. The Appellant admitted that the Appellant correctly described the premises in its particulars of claim and averred that in breach of the Principal and Supplemental Leases described above, the Respondent proceeded to lease the said premises to a third party notwithstanding the subsistence of lease Agreement between the Appellant and the Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment representing the Governmentof Sierra Leone.

4       The Appellant denied having breached cJause 2 (x) of the Principal

Lease or failed to comply with the covenant to repair, cleanse, uphold,

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maintain or keep in good and tenantable repair, the buildings and structures

:•: .•

on the demised premises.

 

·,:        ·.:  :•.

1. In view of the aforesaid.,the Appellant counterclaimed as follows:

 

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1. Damages for breach of contr.act

 

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11.        Damages for wr9ngful ipte rlehincewith quiet enjoyment of demises

 

premises.  _:(
 

:-:    ...
 

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111.       A decl ratidri) at the.Principal and Supplemental lease Agreements dated 2ist October 20{3 and 9th September, 2014 respectively be held to b  \,alid and subsi ting until its expiration.

IV.    ·····C O·S·t -.;::=>·\:.:_.-,.: ::,              .·.:=...

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·  · :}=:::..

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1. I·n: }  plyto the Defence, the Respondent  contended that   by virtue of

:::·

Clause 4 (1) of the Lease Agreement, it had the right to re-enter and reposesss

the demised premises in the event of a breach of any of the covenants contained in the said lease, which was the case in this instance as the Defendant had breached both clauses 2 (iii) and 2 (x).

 

1. It also contended that the Appellant sublet the prem1ses without obtaining the required consent; the fact that the lease was terminated four months after it was signed was irrelevant.

 

1. The Respondent contended that the Appellant failed to develop the premises.

 

·-:·

1. .   In  the  reply  to  counterclaim,  the  Respondent  denied  breaching any

covenant and contended that the Appellant breached fundamental covenants in the lease Agreement.

 

1. It averred that the Lease Agreement was void ab initio as it did not comply with Section 4 (1) of the citizens (Interest in Land) Act, 1966.

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1. The Appellant filed and is_sued  a Judge's Summons dated 10th July,   2017

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praying the  High Court to grant the:::Orde s  prayed for in the counterclaim.

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The Respondent filed an Affidavit .i:i:i O:pp9sit6ionto the said application sworn

 

to by Precious V. K Few.ry:  6n

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th·e; ·  i : dayof July, 2017. This was followed by a

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Supplemental a    da\it sw:  n  f  'io:9. n the 7th September, 2017. Exhibited to the

said Supple!J?.enta.l             ffidavi       was a letter  of  offer leasing a  portion  of   the

premises to ,t 3'rd party·,SABCO FISHING COMPANY.

•'   .•                .·.                 :•.

 

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1. T_he J::    i e's summons was moved on the 20th July, 2017 and responded to

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on theist A gust, 2017.

 

1. In her Judgment dated 12th September, 2017, the Learned Trial Judge, Hon. Justice A Wright J. made the following findings:

 

1. The Plaintiff/Respondent's conduct in its entirety in all the transactions with the parties, i.e the Plaintiff/Respondents and SABCO Fishing Company  was unprofessional, haphazard,  disjointed  and conducted  with

 

reckless disregard for the nature of the Defendant/Applicant's business and operations. The remedies employed to the perceived breaches of the lease agreement and their timing were not only unlawful but not practical and only served to complicate all the respective parties even further, two wrongs did not make right.

1. The Lease Agreement dated 21st October, 2003 and the Supplemental Lease dated 9th December, 2014 respectively are void ab initio and thus not valid in law by the negligence of both the Plaintiff/Respondent and the Administrator General
2. The   Plaintiff/Respondent   has   to   some   extend   interfered   with   the

·,

Defendant/Respondent's quiet enjoyment of the demised pr mises whose Employee/Management became involved in co frontation with the Defendant/Applicant. Furthermore, Jhe purported termination  of the lease

and the subsequent  withdrawal  a1}t   i ryed t;  confuse, scare and to  some

extend paralyse the Defendant/ Appli: t from continuing with its fishing

-  ....-: ): ... ::: <::··     ··;:            ·._.·

operations and further investments as per its operational plan for 2017

which  was  prepared  and  submitted  to  the  Ministry  of  Lands  at   their

,::":: ::•.           :: ·

request.                        ·             --::··:·\

 

1. The  3rd   par,ty

 

S·. ABc ·o ·. whifh::the  Plaintiff/Respondent  offered  a  lease  of

 

.   : .

•:·

portion of the demised premises was a bona fide or innocent purchaser for val_ue.  I.:-: ; the  ligh( of  the  lease,  the  party  has  also  engaged  in  a  not

insi:ghificant·i  vest     {   t on the portion of the demised premises but is yet

 

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to e ecute a lease Agreement with the Plaintiff/Respondent; this, its own

· :-                      •.;

legal ip.terest on the demised  premises is also questionable as it  has    only

complied\vith certain terms and conditions of the offer letter.

Based on these findings, the Learned Trial Judge Ordered as follows:

1. The Defendant/Applicant shall be granted a new Lease Agreement by the Plaintiff/Respondent (at its own cost as damages for the wrongful interference with the quiet enjoyment of the demised premises) from the date of this Order for the maximum statutorily required term and an option if it so desires at a rent in line with  the

 

reviews that were provided for in the Lease Agreement dated 20th October 2003, the demised premises in the Lease Agreement shall be clearly demarcated by the Ministry of Lands and the Defendant/Applicant shall immediately erect a concrete wall on its boundaries.

1. The  Plaintiff/Respondent shall  ensure  the full  compliance  of the

·.

terms and conditions of the offer letter to SABO Fishing Company

dated 12th October 2016, including the clear demarcation of the Land area to be granted and Sabco shall, with immediate effect construct a concrete wall between its operating area and the Defendant/Applicant's area and estabJish a new and different Exit and  Entrance  to  its  operating    ea,  different  from  the   existing

entrance and gates   of the D fendant/Applicant.

;:;:_:·: ....              .    '

1. The Defendant / Applicant sli.'all have full and unfettered access to

 

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the  Jetties  at  the  J:ui_· Fishing  Complex  and  shall  work  out a

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timetable of operati9ns     .tl:l SabcoFishing Company on its usage of

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the said Jetties::.·::            .        ··\ -.:-

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1. The Ministry of lands shalJ..carry out regular inspection/monitoring

 

V

 

 

of  the  Ju·i··Fishing··c·qmpiex  (including  the  Jetties)  that  shall be
demi.sedJ o both' tjle Defendant/Applicant Sabco Fishing  Company

 

.· ..         .·.·,

.•.

and::··s haU involv/ethe  Ministry of Fisheries  and Marine  Resources

=t.:,: for i.t·s Jxpertise: Whenever so required.

.  -.=:·t:J. 5. E ch pariy shall bear its costs.

 

··::.:-...
< >0 1{ the 18th      September,    2017,    the    Appellant   filed     noticev•:.•.

 

appointing C.F. Margai & Associates as Solicitors in place of Tejan-Cole, Yillah

& Bangura.

 
< >Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Trial Judge, the Appellant appealed to this Court against the whole decision on the following grounds:

 

1. The Judge having correctly evaluated the evidence in favour of the Defendan't/Applicant erred in law in her findings and Orders which are at variance with the evaluation of the evidence aforesaid.

Particulars

1. Page 3 under Judge's consideration and ruling paragraph 4: the Plaintiff/Respondent wrote to the Defendants solicitor on 16th   June,

2016... In my mind the Plaintiff/Respondent   should have come to the

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Court to obtain the necessary orders by proving the several breaches it was claiming.

Paragraph 5: The Plaintiff/Respondent proceeded to offer a leasehold interest to a third party (another fishing company6 SABCO Fishing Company)... A letter from the Plaintiff dated 11/2016 confirmed this conduct                                      ..;_:.-           ,    .....: ..

1. Page 4 paragraph 1: howeve,rthe··Plaintiff/Respondent   in 2007  wrote

another letter to the Defenda t/ Applicant. If the  Plaintiff/Respondent

···:··.

claims to have the right of re-entry and forfeiture of the lease, why then was it requesting an action plan··from the Defendant/ Applicant on  its

 

operations on thE;de ised ;p

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,,'
 

iiij_se::s d aimingdiplomatic intervention?

 

Paragraph  2:  The...questfons  in  my  mind  are  ...  are  the  principal and

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supplem ntal leases void in law, thus cannot be valid?

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•...-...:.:·:= ...             ··: :: :\.:       ,    ..

 

 

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Paragra.p: :h3: The .Plaintiff/ Respondent  in its affidavit in opposition  of 28th

'            ...

July, 2di.7... I have not been able to come across any clause whatsoever therein that  can  be.. considered  as  a  clause  to  sublease  the  demised premise.

Paragraphs 4,5,6 and 7 refers

(b) Page 5 -Paragraph 1: it thus follows therefore that the Plaintiff/Respondent had no right whatever to lease a portion of the demised premises to a third party ... And SABCO Fishing Company does not seen to have as valid lease agreement.

 

1. The Judge should in law have discountenance the Affidavit in Opposition sworn to by Precious V.K. Fewry at Freetown on the 28th July, 2017 together with the exhibits attached thereto as well as the Supplemental Affidavit in Opposition sworn to and filed by Precious

V.K. Fewry at Freetown on the 7th day of September, 2017 as deponent and Solicitor for the Plaintiff on the grounds that both Affidavits contravene Order 59 of.the High Court Rules C.1. No. 8 of 2007 which when juxtaposed with exhibit SES1 Writ of Summons dated 17th June, 2016 FfCC 170/ 2016 No. 49 issued by Osman I. Kanu, Principal State Counsel, as Solicitor for the Plaintiff, in the absence of a Notice of Change of Solicitor.

1. The title the Attorney-General & Minister of Justice as Plaintiff in the

:•,·,:

said proceedings is unsupported in law, considering that the office is a

creature of statute with prescribeJ}'. unc.ti  · .

1. The Learned Judge having_;-fqµnl in paragraph 1 of page 5 that the

 

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Plaintiff/Respondent        no rig4ftolease a portion of the premises to a

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third party, even if the Def ndant had breach the covenant of the lease

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agreement, the Learr{ d Judge'. rredin law in not setting aside the said

· ·::,      •.- ·- -         : ·

lease  as  well  as·-:·o cleririg·j ts  expunction  from  the  Deed  of  Leases

·'·'·: ;

 

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registered in the office..of the Registrar and Administrator-General and by.exte'nsion,orderirig the third party, i.e. SABCO Fishing Company to

 

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forthwith  hand  o er  possession of the  portion  of  the premises

··:

. purpo: dly  leased  by  the  Plaintiff/ Respondent          to  them;  this  the

LEiar ed Judge failed to do.

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::, >.                                                                      Particulars

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(a) Page·5 1: it thus follows therefore that the Plaintiff/Respondent had no right whatsoever to lease a portion of the demised premises to a third party... The Defendant/Applicant's lease may be void and SABCO Fishing Company does not seen to have a valid lease agreement.

 

 

 

 

1. In consequence, the Appellant sought the following relief:

 

1. That the findings and Orders be set aside and one in favour of the Defendant/Applicant be substituted therefore,

 

1. Such other or further reliefs to be granted to meet the Justice of the case &

 

1. Costs                                                                                 

I have listened to my Lord Taylor-Kamara  and agree with his narration    of

 

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events. I shall now therefore proceed to deal with t..he grounds of appeal.

1. Despite  these  rather  detailed  ground  pf appeal,  the  issues  to   be

 

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determined by this Court can be summarise  .as follows:        =·
 

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1.  

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Whether  the  Trial  Judge  was  right  in  arrivine  at  her  findings and

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making the Orders thereof in.Jl light 0f:th  evidence adduced.

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1. Was  the  Learned  Judge  correct' in  law to  Order  the  Respondent to

 

....

ensure full complian -  9f th· Terms and conditions of the offer letter to

-:             ··.:::::-:--

SABCO  Fi_hing CoTI}pany  dated  the 12th  October,  2016  including  the

clear    em; ;    c1ti on  }\:he land  area to be granted  and SABCO  Fishing

··::,. :,            ··::::::: :              \ ;

Cqmpariy shall"with #nmediate effect construct a concrete wall between

,:::··             .   ?::.             ., '\  ;,·

. its  operating  area  and  the  Appellant's  area  and  create  a  new   and

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·" ·..4Jfferent  exit and  Entrance  to its  operating  area,  different  from the

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exi tjng entrance and gates to the Appellant.

·:-:-

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1. In an;wer to the first question, I shall enquire whether there is any available evidence upon which the Trial Judge could have relied on the in concluding that the Lease Agreements dated 21st October, 2003 and the Supplemental Lease dated 9th December, 2013 respectively are void ab  initio  and  thus  not  valid  in  law  by  the  negligence  of  both the

 

 

 

 

Respondent and the Administrator General. The reason for this enquiry is that if this was the correct position of the law, then it would justify the Order made in favour of SABCO. Subject to the fact to the fact that the said SABCO was neither a party in the court below nor in this court.

 

1. In his synopsis, Osman I. Kanu Esq. Counsel for the Respondent argued that the Appellant had breached clause 2 (x), a fundan:iental clause of the Principal Lease agreement which provides for the Appellant not to sublet or part with possession or occupation of the premise·s demisedor any  part  thereof  without  the   written  consent  of the land lord,  such

consent should  not be unreasonably withheld, and clause 2  (iii)   which

.•

require the Appellant  to at times  during the said  term  of the lease  to

·                                       ·.:

repair, uphold, maintain and keel? in tehantable repairs the buildings and structures  of the demised  pr :fuises.  He submitted  that due to  the

 

breaches, the Respondent
 

_onsis;t: n··t

-!•!·  ,•        '
 

with clause 4 (i) of the  principal

 

Lease,  the  Respondent  re-ehtfred  the  vacant  part  of  the    demised

·,

premises and instituted cou,r. t proceedings to obtain possession of the un

 

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occupied part.                      \@}

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1. Mr. Kap.u argued in the alternative that the lease Agreements were

void \; in t.io}   6  fai1di e to comply with Section 4(1) of the Non-citizens

(i te;rest i:d:: Land):  ·A t, 1966 Act No. 30  of 1966 which provides that' No

•:••:\                  ;:::.

:  npn-citizen  s_hall  purchase  or  receive  in  exchange  or  as  a  gift  any

·; :  i .seryed\ e--  ehold in the Western Area without obtaining first a licence

. -=:: :::\

from'tqe board.' On this point, Mr. Kanu relied on pages 6 and 7 of the

Judgm nt of Wright J . in which Her Ladyship stated as follows :" The above transaction and the resulting instrument is non-compliant on three levels, first, the required licence not obtained by the Defendant from the Board, secondly, the term of 50 (fifty) years granted when it should be twenty-one (21) years; thirdly, the fact that the Registrar­ General  proceeded  to register the resultant  Lease Agreement without

 

ascertaining  that  all  the  requirements    for  non-citizen  have  been complied with."

 

1. In his synopsis on the issue of subletting, C.F. Margai Esq. Counsel for the Appellant referred to page 44 of the Records and page 3 of the Judgment wherein the Trial Judge said as follows:-

• Paragraph 4 "...In my mind, the Plaintiff/Respondent should have come to court to obtain the necessary Orders by proving the several breaches it was claiming

·-:. .        ··.·

Page 245 of the Records and page 4 of the Ruling:

• Paragraph 1: However, the Plaintiff/Respondent in 2017 wrote another letter to the Deferid ni/ Applicant, requesting a 1 year Action     plan     from     t·he =·=     Defendant /Applicant.    If    the

Plaintiff / Respon dent: s:,         ·:s:   t··o·  have  the  right  of  re-entry  and

···.. : ,•  ,•,•.,i:..;...

forfeiture of th     lease·, why·  then was it requesting  an action plan

.•          ...                        - :,..':-.

from  the  Defendant  pp  its'.:::9peration on  the  demised  premises

·:::::.          ,::·:- _:·:::..      ..r

claimin, g q iplofu_ tic inteiyention

:; ,:::,:'' ::•. •.  ····j:\                }

• Paragraph6:: ;. The·:·Agnfoment  in  this  instant  case  is  called  a

· --..:

cooperation contract "... nothing therein makes reference to sub-

 

.·.·- , --':-
 

,• •:                        :.::

 

.::: t
 

Leasing. The Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence whatsoever to

,;,:·,.          .::

 

• .:=:-.
 

......,=\\...bac·k

.... ..;.·,:.:::._ .
 

its  assertion  that  the  Defendant  indeed  subleased    the

\.

 

·,,-:;., .,       'd  Il).is edpremises to a 3rd  party.

' 4;t,; ...    '

1. .::.r have studied the arguments of both Couns el on this point and I

,,'

agree with the Appellant that the Orders given by the the Trial Judge were at variance with the evidence. In particular, her Ladyship in her Judgment clearly stated that the relationship between the Appellant and Monza Fishing Company (the Company the Appellant purportedly sub­ leased to) was one of the cooperation contract and not sub-leasing. In her own words, "the Plaintiff has not adduced any evidence whatsoever

 

to back its assertion that the Defendant indeed subleased the demised premises to a third party". Her Ladyship continued on paragraph 7, page 246 of the Records "... in this instant case, the Defendant was not in breach of the covenant not to sublet the premises to a third party."

 

1. It  follows  from   the  foregoing   that  the  Trial   Judge  gave   an

.',

improper Order for the Appellant to be granted a new Lease Agreement whilst the Lease and supplemental Lease Agreement dated 20th October, 2003  registered  as  No. 150/2003  at  page 11 in  volume  96  and 9th

December,  2014 registered as No.  241/2014 at page 106 in volume  112

,.

respectively  of the  Book  of  Leases  kept  in  the office  of the  Registrar­

 

...

General was still subsisting save the istake in granting a term contrary

>·      ....

to existing law: even this could b,e curedby rectification.

·::\ :

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1. In any event, in the si :;; Leonea case of MACFOY -V-    U.A.C

OF SIERRA LEON:E::: LIMI1J:pc}   t 64-66)ALL. SL3, the Court of Appeal

·::.: ..          ,,  :,..- :::; { \.           ..

 

not.

held that  a l ssee wh'cr.had  cqyenanted   not  to part  with  possession of

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demised premises was      in  breach  of that covenant  where he merely

'    :,:                 ·- : }.

permitted anqtper per$on to have use of the premises whilst he retained

, ..:·-::-:? .           ··:::( ·           .:'

p9ssessiozj.,;..as  a_l  §ee. This was what happened  in this case as in the

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wor s of the :T rial' J udge herself, the relationship between the Appellant

...          ,    .:::?:...              ·: ::,

 

,.:..·                      .    .

·;:_._ d the::p  rported sub-lessee was one of co-operation. I have not found

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ariy r  _as·o-  ..depart from that finding.

•:•:: ',',

 

1. Having disposed of the complaint that  the  Appellant  had sublet the premises without the consent of the Respondent, I shall  now move  on to the question of whether the Lease should be terminated on the ground of breach of the covenant to repairs etc . On this point the Trial Judge said that the length of time the Appellant has spent on  the  demised  premises  and  the very significant  quantum  of investment  the

 

Appellant has sunk into its operations on the demised premises is of paramount importance to this Court.

 

1. In her words, 'the structures on the premises were old and required substantial investments to rehabilitate and maintain."
2. Bairaman C.J defined the tenant's obligation  to  repair  as being a duty to keep the premises wind and water tight but no duty to sustain and uphold the premises nor be responsible for natural wear and tear (JOHNSON -V- ZACHARIAH (1957-60)) ALR SL118. ()Referred to by Ade Renner Thomas in his book LAND TENURE IN SIERRA LEONE (PP.  96-97).  The  question  is  did  the  Respondent  provide  evidence to

prove that  the Appellant  has  not  kep{\ h, e·...premises  in  good  order  in

.•.     :•:            .

accordance with the terms of tl}e aghfoment? No such evidence was provided. These were premises Ji 4 for fishing and related activities  as

such businesses have their.<>\Yll p. eJ  ti faritiesas regards sanitation etc.

.    \:\::'.'.··,: \··. ·=-=-i.   -:··

1. On this point,  Beok:u ·B  tts. J.  in JABER -V-  JABER (1950-56)

'\;            ..::•:\:           •;:;·

ALR S.L. 97 had thist··9:),·•s.ay.·:   ·,·==L=..-..

.. •.-··:.::.         . ...··::· ,: ...r-=

" Mate'ri l facts···to be taken into consideration in determining whether..the}    as· be  n  at ; each of  the  covenant  to  repair  are  the locality,

•. .                    .

character    of thi  premis s ,"

.•:·

 

1. ·=  Th·e:  o nly  logical  conclusion  on  this  point  would  be  that  no evid ;ce has been provided to prove that the Appellant was in breach of the co hant to repair etc... Even if that had been the case, under the Conveyancy and Law of property Act 1881, the Respondent must have first served a notice on the Appellant specifying the particular breach complained of and requiring that it be remedied, if possible, ora reasonable compensation thereof. Section 14 of the Conveyancy and Law of  Property  Act, 1881 gives the Courts a wide discretion  to grant  relief

 

against forfeiture. This was the position in BASMA -V- NOURELDINE (1950-59) ALR SL234 where the Court exercised its discretion in favour of granting relief against forfeiture for breach of covenant to repair.

 

1. As regards the Order of the Trial Judge regarding full compliance of the letter of offer to SABCO, I hold that she ought not to have granted that Order. Under page 51 paragraph 1 of the Judgment, the Trial Judge

after holding that the Appellant   was not in breach  of th_e covenant to

·,

sublet without written permission of the Respondent, as it did not sublet

.·                          .

to  a third  party,  went  on to say "it thus follows  therefore  that,    the

Plaintiff/Respondent had no right whatspev·erto lease a portion of the demised premises to a third party, even if the Defendant had breached the covenants of the lease agreement, the Plaintiff should have ensured that the Defendants  were evicted from the demised  premises    before

 

..               •.

granting   a lease of a porti_qn 9f th  .d  mised premises to a third party;

•,

the   Plaintiff/Responde t's  conduct   can   be  construed   as  wrongful

 

 

.

interference with fl?·.

.

demised premises·.
 

D fe qa t/Applicant's     quiet possession of the

•,• .::-:.        ::

' .- J'he  T. rial  Judge  notwithstanding  this  analysis

 

granted an Order in faJ ur of the third party SABCO on the ground that

· : :.:

it was a.bona fide or innocent purchaser for value and they have engaged

:. :::               •:... ·•.·           · ...;

in  a  riot   ins.igni  qnit   investment   on  the  portion   of  the  demised

,·  -: .            '•!·.:·:..          .::· :::·

pre ises. I/     th respect, hold a contrary view for reasons I shall proffer

··: .·                   -:•,

.. .   ·-: :ft  rlty.. .. ,,;/·: :/:).

 

 

1. In  t-h

 

<case of  RONALD  LISK CAREW -V-   ALIMAMY SAMUEL

 

.

:·,,
 

BANGURA CIV.APP 39/2009, (unreported), the Court of Appeal set aside the Order by the Trial Judge granting title to a non-party.

 

1. The Respondent in the instant case did not apply to the Court below to add SABCO as a party nor did it subsequently apply to amend his statement of claim. The Learned Trial Judge did not also sue  moto

 

 

 

make either or all of such orders. These are the applicable conditions set out by Browne-Marke JSC in the case of RONALD LISK CAREW -V­ ALIMAMY SAMUEL BANGURA( ubi supra) which I adopt herein.

 

1. Another justification given by Learned Trial Judge for giving an Order in favour of the 3rd party SABCO was that they were Bona fide or innocent  purchaser  for  value. Accepting  this  justification  would be

stretching the doctrine to breaking point. This doctrine also known  as

·.

bona fide purchaser for value, good faith purchaser, innocent purchaser,

purchaser in good faith refers to a person who purchases for value without notice of any other party's claim against the property. It simply means one who purchases property _to/ a valuable consideration that is

an inducement for entering into:··a contract and without suspicion    of

,:_;::-::·

being defrauded or deceived by tlie seller. He or she has no notice of any

::.     :•>·

defects of the title. A bona:fide purchas r  pays in good faith, the   full

- :     ·,· •,.                           .

value for the proper.ty and, witho?t any fraud goes into possession.

 

 

1. SABCO is in th

 

.•.

fishi g ._.Industry as is the Appellant. Both are

.•.

 

competitors··a d kno.w bf each other. SABCO ought to have known that

the  pre   i:  ....were  l ased  to  the  Appellant       and  that  no  Court  had

..;:; : ::..       \.:::       r

on;Iered·::'fprfeitrire  of:- the  leasehold  interest.  Before  applying  for  the

·<          :<:::.           : :-:

 

le·a
 

'  SAB_CO, would have visited   the premises which  visit could have

 

,·.:

··:.
 

.r  vealJ<:1.the d'ccupation of the land by the Appellant. They have legal dviser(·) \. ho should  have informed  them that due process had  not

bee,.n fq}1owed in offering a portion of the premises to them. SABCO is

:,:,:

clearly not an innocent purchaser and therefore not entitled to  benefit

from that equitable remedy; for equity has an interest in and power over the purchaser's conscience.

 

1. The Respondent argued in the alternative that the Lease was null and  void as it failed  to comply  with Section  4 of the   Non-Citizens

 

(Interests in Land) Act, 1966 I note that this aspect of the Respondent's argument was not pleaded in the Writ of Summons.

 

1. Section 4 (1) provides that "no non-citizens shall purchase or receive in exchange or as a gift any reserved leaseholds in the Western Area without first obtaining a licence from the Board". In Section 2, Board means a Board consisting of the Ministers responsible for Trade and Industrial,  Lands, Finance and the Atto rney-Gen. eral, of which the

Minister of Lands shall be the Chairman. The Trial Judge held.. that the Appellant as a non-native by not complying with the said provision have

rendered the Lease Agreements dated 21s t October, 2003 and the supplemental  Lease dated 9th Decem_b e,r, 2014 respectively were void ab

,· '•'.-"f:·

initio. I do not share that view. An agreement is void ab initio when it is

considered invalid from the tim··e=i f\ ,vqs written and/or signed (i.e. from

·-:•    •'  ·-:·

the start of the contract). In. the instant case the correct procedure to be

-•,:: . ·-:<• :•:"-::•               ··:·

followed  in  the  grant .:qf  a  lease  was  complied with  -   offer letter,

:,:•            •.                                               "" :

payment  of lease r nt  and prep ration  of the lease  agreement. The

::·           .;:·:-..::;::-:...       /

difficultly arose when.no appliG tion was made to Board for a  licence.

Even that qid;      f \:tjqkJ  \ h: :a_gi  ement void as Section 5 of the said  Act

'.·>>                      ':{·\.

provides thaf"if sati"sn ed that the failure to observe the law was due to

.•:· :,.                  :::::               }

genuine and excusa?le mistake or ignorance (whether of the law or fact),

thJ:  oard ?nay)"  :: ··

 

,:

a) Permit the parties to annul the transaction or modify it in such a manner as may he approved by the Board and grant such licence as may be necessary in relation thereto; or
b}"'Cause the Sheriff to sell property by public auction ..."
< >In effect, such an agreement could at worst be voidable in the event that the Board chooses option (B).In any event, the events surrounding this transaction are akin to a dark comedy. Here the Appellant applied for a leasehold interest from the Minister of Lands, who gave it a letter of offer which he took to  the

(

 

Attorney-General for a Lease Agreement to be prepared. After preparing and registering the said Lease, the said Minister of Lands and the Attorney- General purported to terminate the lease on the ground that the lessee had not applied for a licence from a Board of which the  Minist er of Lands is Chairman and the Attorney-General, a member. The Appellant is a Company having shareholders in Egypt and operating in Sierra Leone by virtue of a bilateral relationship etween the two countries. The Respondent ought to have advised Appellant on the procedure to be followed in the grant of a lease to a non-citjzen. This

was  not  done  and  the  Minister  of  Lands  th.. rough  the  Law  Officer's Department  later  purported  to  terminate  the lease  on  the  ground of

non-conformity with the law. Given thfse facts, Section 5 (2) (a) should

·.;

have applied. Allowing otherwise.would be tantamount to sanctioning official gangsterism.                    \ t -:. ·.  ·:.··· .,·- :::
< >That   the    Administf ator-Gern·  al       registered     the    lease    and·-:;_ .-,• · ·:::;:: :-. ...   <:;:          •,

 

supplemental  lease withou·t r eference  to the Section  6 (1)  (a) of   Act

would not make theih invalid a-     \ gards the interest of the Appellant for

··:                  :-:. ::··.:.

the maxim Omnia pr fes umufur.et solemter rite esse acta shall apply.

-:•. ::!::: .•:    -  .J: .            ·
< >I ha.y. e read Ju·-: stice     ynn's draft opinion  and also that of Justice

SE.NGU M. KOROMA JA

 

 
 

 

 

 

RULING  SMK/CK I 17