S v Seisay and Another (S.C. CR.APP. NO.1/84 S.C. CR.APP. NO.2/84)  SLSC 2 (09 July 1986);
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF SIERRA LEONE
The Hon, Mr. Justice C.A. Harding, J.S.C. - Presiding
The Hon. Mrs. Justice A.V.A. Auunar-Renner - J.S.C.
The Hon. Dr. Justice O.M. Golley - J.A.
S.C. CR.APP. NO.1/84 S.C. CR.APP. NO.2/84 BETWEEN:
MOHAMED LAMIN SEISAY - APPELIANTS (ALIAS PITTY)
AND SAMBA JALLOH
vs THE STATE - RESPONDENT
B. MACAULAY (JNR) for 2nd Appellant H. TEJAN JALLOH (MISS) for The State JUDGMENT DELIVERED THIS 9th DAY OF July 1986.
A. AWUNOR-RENNER. J.S.C.:- The appellants wore convicted at the Kenema High Court on the 1st day of October 1976 before Navo J. as he then was, and a jury, for the murder of one Albert Samba on the 2nd day of May 1976 at Lowoma Village in the Lower Bambara Chiefdom, Kenema District and sentenced to death. They appealed to the Court of Appeal and Judgment was delivered on the 10th day of November 1981 dismissing the appeal and affirming the conviction and sentence of the High Court. It is against that decision that the appellants have now appealed to this Court on the following grounds viz:— On behalf of the 1st appellant:
(a) That the Court of Appeal for Sierra Leone was wrong in Lay in holding that the verdict was not unreasonable nor could it not be supported having regard to the evidence adduced at the trial.
(b) That the Court of Appeal was wrong in (Law when it held that the Learned Trial Judge's direction to the jury that if there is any doubt, I am not saying any fanciful doubt, but if there is any substantial doubt, you should resolve that doubt in favour of the accused persons and let them go free was in order.
(c) that the Court was wrong in law when it held that there was no evidence to leave to the jury fox the consideration of the issue of provocation and or self defence on behalf of the 2nd applicant On behalf of the 2nd appellant:
(a) The Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the appellants defence of alibi was properly put to the Jury.
(b) The, Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the learned trial judge had not misdirected the jury on the grounds of implied malice.
(c) The Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the learned trial judge had not misdirected the Jury as to the standard of proof imposed upon the prosecution.
The 1st Appellant was not represented by Counsel, however the Court took cognizance of his grounds of appeal that were before us.
The facts so far according to the prosecution and defence as it is necessary to state them are as follows:
On the night of the 1st May 1976 at Lowoma Village in the Lower Bambare Chiefdom the deceased . Albert Samba staged a dance at the Barri. One Kane Samba Baa at the dance helping the deceased to sell tickets at the entrance to the Barri. His wife Elizabeth Jan (alias Binta Samba) was also present running the bar. Later on that same night Mohamad Daramy 2nd accused in the High Court who is now dead came and eat by Kens Sambe; whan he was questioned about his ticket ha said that he had bought one earlier in the evening but had lost it. An argument ensued between the deceased and Mohamad Daramy which later on resulted in a fight between the two of then. Binta held the deceased by his trousers and then took him out side. By that time 1st and 2nd appellants were standing outside and as Binta took the deceased away the 1st appellant was board saying "Let us go and finish with the dog": as the deceased was
being taken away he was overtaken by the two appellants and Daramy. They crossed in front of them. The second appellant than kicked Binta on her stomach and the 1st appellant broke a bottle on a stone and stabbed the deceased on the right side of his neck. He was then taken into a house whence he later died. Both appellants did not give any evidence or call witnesses but relied on the state-ments which they made to the Police and which were tendered in evidence in the High Court. The 1st appellant in his statement denied being present at the scene of the alleged incident; in fact he claimed that he was not in Lowoma Village at all but in Tokpombu II Village in the Tongo area where he spent the day and evening in the company of one Alpha Jalloh and some other people until 1 a.m. whan he retired to bed and woke up at 7 a.m. on the Sunday the 2nd day of May 1976.
The 2nd appellant also alleged that he toe was not at the scene but that he spent the night at the house of one Pa Momoh Kpakateh. The other inmates of the house he claimed including the 1st appellant went out at about 10 p.m. and that he was alone in the house until the early hours of the morning when the 1st appellant returned to the house panting; there was blood on the 1st appellant's shirt and when he 2nd appellant questioned him about it the 1st appellant stated that he had been involved in a fight with some one who had bitten him. He was later on arrested and charged.
Three grounds of appeal have been urged on behalf of the 2nd appellant: however I propose only to deal with those which in my opinion are substantial.
The second ground of appeal raised by Berthan Macaulay (Jnr) counsel for the 2nd appellant was that the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the learned trial Judge had not misdirected the jury on the grounds of implied malice. He referred this Court to what the Court of Appeal had to say about Malice aforethought -and I quote:—
"Counsel for the 1st and 3rd appellants had submitted that the judge's direction on malice aforethought with particular
reference to implied malice is erroneous. Appellants' Counsel had submitted that the Judge had employed the subjective test in directing the jury on whether there wee implied mailce or not he should have used the objective test as propounded in Sahr Nbambay and others.
The judge did not fall into the error as he did not direct the jury that it was the subjective test that they had to apply. I agree with Counsel for the state that he sorely gave an example of a factual situation that could amount to implied malice I find no merit in this ground.
He further referred this Court to quotations from the summing up of the Learned Trial Judge and again I quote -
"Then we come to the most important ingredient with malice aforethought.
The death must be with malice aforethought, What does that mean?
Malice does not mean premeditation. We have two categories of malice, express malice and implied malice. In the case of express malice there is an intention to cause death, or cause grievous bodily harm to any person, whether such person is the person killed or not. Now you make up your mind and say 'I am going to kill some body'. I will take my gun, 1 am going to shoot at A. If. you shoot at A and A dies that is express malice. You had it in mind to do something which will cause grievous bodily harm to A or which may cau6s the death of the parson against whom you inflict or on whom you inflict injuries etc.
He then continued to explain what is meant by express malice, On the question of implied malice the learned trial judge directed the jury in this way.
"Implied malice in many cases where no malice is expressed or openly intended, the law will imply it from a deliberately crual act committed by a person against another."
"Deliberately cruel act although you did not intend to kill somebody but do a deliberate curel act, and that act causes his death, you are guilty of murder because the ingredient of implied malice would have been provided."
"It may be implied where death occurs as a result of a voluntary act of the prisoner which was intended and unprovoked. You were not prevoked to do what you have done. I will deal with provocation later on. It must be unprovoked. The law will imply malice from your action and if death occurs or if death results. It is implied that you had malice aforethought you will be found guilty of murder."
"All the other ingredients in murder are in manslaughter except that in manslaughter the prosecution need not prove malice aforethought. That is perhaps the most important ingredient in the case of murder. The prosecution must prove malice either express or implied;"
Mr. Macaulay (Jot.) further contended that the learned trial Judge in his direction to the jury- an the question of implied malice should have explained what this meant to them in simple language and not merely read out ipssisama verba the contents of Archibold Criminal Pleadings Evidence and Practice Thirty-Fifth edition at page 918 paragraph 2487 under the rubric. "Implied malice" to them which states as follows:
"In many cases where no malice is expressed or openly indicated the law will imply it from a deliberate curel act committed by one person against another. It may be implied where death occurs as a result of a voluntary act of the prisoner which was (1) intentional and (2) unprovoked."
He referred the Court to several cases in support of his proposition namely Feika v. Begins C.A. 1968/1969. A.L.R,. (S.L.) 342 at page 345, R. V. Kargbo same volume a»t- page 354 and also Susana v. R. 1970-1971. A.L.B. (S.L.) at page 306 at 316. He also submitted that the trial judge having directed the jury on implied malice failed to relate that direction to the evidence which had been led relying on the following casses - R. v Finch 12 C. App. Reports at page 77. Sallu Mansaray v The State unreported Supreme Court Criminal Appeal 1/80. The learned trial judge he said seemed to feel that there watt implied malice since he speake of voluntary act and deliberately cruel act and was also equating the actus reus with meos res. In his reply ha alleged further that the learned trial judge did not refer to any evidence which would suggest express malice or implied malice but simply read the law to them and that ha made no attempt to direct the jury as to whether this was express or implied malice. Counsel for the respondent Miss Tejan Jalloh stated that express malice and implied malice are components of malice aforethought. She expressed the view that the learned trial Judge only referred to implied malice through an abundance of caution and that what was relevant in this case was express malice. She also referred to the case of Sallu Mansaray supra.
Let me now examine some of the authorities cited by Counsel for the respondent as far as they relate to ground 2 of this appeal. In Feika v ReRegina supra, a Court of Appeal decision, one of the grounds of appeal was that the trial judge misdirected the jury on provocation by reading from a text book. It was held in that case that in directing the jury on the law applicable to the case being tried the judge should not resort to reading passages from a text book without more. In Kargbo v. Regina 1968/69 A.L.R. (S.L.) also another Court of Appeal decision at page 354 two of the grounds of appeal were (1) that the learned trial judge failed to direct the Jury adequately on the defence of provocation and (2) that he did not give proper direction with regard to the right of self defence. It was held that a judge in his summing-up' should.
not confine his direction on the law to reading from a legal text book, it is his duty to explain in simple language the principle of law applicable to the case, to consider the questions raised by the prosecution and defence respectively and to direct the jury on how to apply the law to the facts. I quota from the judgment of Tanbiah J.A. at page 356 -
"Unfortunately there is Misdirection as well as non-direction in the summing-up of the learned trial judge. He adopted a procedure which has been condemned both by this Court and the Court of Appeal in England. He read passages from Archibold without analysing the obetruse prepositions of law stated therein. Members of the jury are laymen who have no training in the law and liable to be confused when passages from a text book are read to them. They will not be in a position to comprehend the difficult questions of law applicable to the facts of a case. It is the duty of a judge to explain ill simple language the principles of law applicable to the case and to direct them on how to apply the law to the facts,"
See Also the cases of Sumana v R. reported in 1970/71 A.L.R. (S.L.) at page 306 and at page 316. R. v. Finch reported in 12 Cr. App. Rep, at page 77. Sallu Mansaray v The State S.C. Cr. App. No.1/80 unreported. In my opinion the authorities cited above clearly support the contention that it is not sufficient merely to direct the jury on the law of a case; they are entitled as well to the judges' assistance on facts and it is also his duty to explain to them in simple language the principles of law applicable to the case in the circumstances.
In the present case I feel that the jury were deprived of the assistance of the learned trial judge in his summing-up. Indeed he proceeded to give them the definition of what was express malice and also tried to explain the meaning of this to them but he further went on to confuse the jury and misled them by bringing in the
definition of implied malice and not bothering to explain this to language them in simple language and by also not telling them which of the two,
express or implied malice was applicable in the present circumstance! He had Tailed in his duty by omitting to direct the jury sufficiently on this point. I cannot say whether the Jury properly directed would have convicted him. I would therefore allow the appeal on this ground.
The next ground of appeal of the 2nd appellant is a much more serious one and deals with the learned trial judge's misdirecting the jury as to the standard of proof imposed upon the prosecution. This ground of appeal is common to both appellants and it is my view that it can be dealt with conveniently together. In a nut shell Barthan Macaulay (Jnr) for the 2nd appellant submitted that the learned trial judge misdirected the jury on the standard of proof required in a criminal case by equating the words "reasonable doubt" with "substantial doubt". He submitted further that one cannot say that the phrase reasonable doubt is synonymous with the phrase substantial doubt. He contended that by using the word substantial doubt the Court was imposing a lower standard of proof upon the prosecution. He also called the Court's attention to certain portions in the summing up about which he was complaining and relied on the following authorities in support of this last ground of appeal, Koroma v Regina 1964/66 A.L.R. (S.L.) at page 542 at page 547.R.v.Sumners (1953) Cr. App. R. at page 16. Finally he ended up by saying that the case of Bater v Bater relied on by the Court of Appeal was a cess involving a divorce petition and had no relevance with the standard of proof in a criminal matter. Miss Tejan—Jalloh for respondent contended that no particular form of words are needed as long as the trial judge puts the case adequately that will suffice, she also relied on R. v Sumners supra and invited the Court to apply the provisions of sub-sec. 2 of sec.58 of the Court's Act number 30 of 1965. On the other Hand Mr. Macaulay however urged this Court to reject the question of applying the provisions of sub section 2 of each 58 of the Court's Act supra as he said that each case should depend on its own facts as regards misdirections and non—directions.
The following directions on the burden and standard of proof wars given by the learned trial judge in his summing-up and I quote:-
(1) "It is for the prosecution to prove their case beyond reasonable doubt. If that doubt exists either from the case for the prosecution, or is created by the defence, and you find out that it is a reasonable doubt and not a fanciful doubt the law requires you to resolve that doubt in favour of the accused persons."
(2) "If you have any, substantial doubt let them go free."
(3) "If there is any doubt, I an not saying a fanciful doubt, but if there is any substantial doubt you should resolve that doubt in favour of the accused persons and let them go free."
(4) "If they do, then you may say, those discrepancies may cause considerable doubts — reasonable doubts - but so far as the prosecution is concerned they say 1st accused, "You wait let us go and do away with the dog."
(5) "If you take into consideration the various discrepancies in his evidence and you say that taking these witnesses evidence into consideration there is substantial doubt in your minds. I 'am not saying fanciful doubts. If it creates any doubts in your mind, you are bound to resolve that doubt in favour of the accused parsons."
(6) "If it goes to the toot of the case it destroys the case for the prosecution completely or creates a substantial doubt in your minds then you are bound to resolve that doubt in favour of the accused parsons. If they do not shake your conscience that a substantial doubt has been created it is for. you to say Oh, yes ha may have made a mistake here and there."
(7) "But it is for you again to say whether there is a substantial discrepancy that created a doubt in your minds. If it does then, of course you will say it does not make us think this way or that way, therefore the benefit must go to the accused persons."
Having referred to extracts from the summing-up it now remains for me to examine certain reported cases dealing with the burden and standard of proof. In all criminal trials it is the duty of the trial judge to direct the jury that on the evidence the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused to their satisfaction before they convict and that the onus of proof rests upon the prosecution; this must be made quite clear to the jury in no uncertain terms. In the case of R. v Raymond Blackburn reported in volume 39 of the Criminal Appeal reports at page 84, S, Gorman J. in delivering the judgment of the Court had. this to say and I quote:-
"It is for the judge to deal properly with the question of the burden of proof. One matter is quite clear. It cannot be said and this Court does not intend to say that any particular form of words is absolutely necessary or, the Court is concerned with the question whether, whatever form of words was used it was made quits clear to the jury that it was for the prosecution to establish the guilt of the prisoner and if the guilt of the prisoner is not established the prisoner must as of right and not by way of favour be found not guilty. This Court does not subscribe to the view that a particular form of words of necessity means that the summing up was right or that the absence of a particular form of words necessarily means that it was wrong."
See also the case of Koroma v. R. reported in (1964/66) A.L.R. (S.L.) at page 582. fin the case of Woolmington v D.P.P. 1935 A.C. at page 462 at page 481: A House of Lord's decision expressly approved the direction to a jury that "the prosecution must prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
In the case of R. v Hepworth and Norman Fearnly reported in volume 39 Cr. App. Reports at page 152. The case of R. v Summers 36. Cr. App. R. at page 14 was commented on and approved. In that case the learned recorder in his summing up failed to direct the jury adequately as to the burden of proof and the standard of proof required. It was held that there was no sat formula for explaining to the jury in a summing-up that the burden of proof lies on the prosecution. To tell them that they must be satisfied by the evidence as that they must be satisfied by the evidence so that they can feel sure that the prosecution has established the guilt of the prisoner is appropriate, merely to tell the jury that they must be satisfied with regards to the prisoners guilt is insufficient. The use also of the phrase "reasonable doubt" is better avoided.
I think that it will be appropriate for me to refer to a portian in the judgment Goddard L.C.3. which I think is relevant to the present case in my view. I quote:
"Another complaint that is made in this case is that the recorder used only the word "satisfied". It may be especially in view of the number of cases recently in which this question has arisen, that I misled Courts when I said in R. v. Summers 36 Cr. Appeal R. at page 14, at page 15, and I still adhere to it - that I think it is very unfortunate to talk to juries about reasonable doubt, because the explanation given of what is and what is not a reasonable doubt are so very often extraordinary difficult to follow and it is very difficult to tell a jury what is a reasonable double. To tell a jury that it must not be a fanciful doubt is no real guidance. To tell them that a reasonable doubt is such a doubt as would cause them to hesitate in their own affairs never seems to me to convey such a particular standard; one member of the Jury might say that he would hesitate over something and another member might say that something would not
cause him to hesitate at all. I therefore suggested in that case, that it would be better to use some other expression, by which I meant that should be conveyed to the jury that they should convict only if they feel sure of the guilt of the accused. In some cases the words "satisfied" has been used. It is said that a jury in a civil case has to be satisfied and, therefore one is laying down the same principles as. in a civil cast. I confess that I have had some difficulty in understanding how there is or there can be two standards if one said in a criminal case to a jury] "You must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt" and one could also says "You must be completely satisfied" or better still, "You must feel sure of the prisoner's guilt." But I desire to repeat what I said in the case of Kritz 33 Cr. App. R. at page 169 at page 177; It is not the particular formula of words that matter; it is the effect of the summing-up. If the jury are charged with one set of wprds_or in another and are made to understand that they have to be satisfied and must not return a verdict against a defendant unless they feel sura, and that the onus is all the time on the prosecution and not on the defence""that is enough" I shall be very sorry if it were thought that case should depend on the use of a particular formula or particular word or, words. The point is that the jury should be directed first that the. onus is always on the prosecution. Secondly before they convict they must feel sure of the prisoner's guilt. If that is dona that is enough."
In the latter cases of McGraevy v. D.P.P. (1973) 1 W.L.R. at page 276 and R. v Sang (1979) 2 All E.R. at page 1223, it was stated that it must "be made plain to a jury that they must not convict unless they are satisfied of guilt beyond reasonable doubt" It is now submitted that this is the proper direction to give on the standard of proof laid on the prosecuton to prove guilt.
Counsel for the 2nd appellant had also argued that the learned trial judge in portions of his summing-up had net only appeared to place the burden of proof on the appellant but that he had failed to put the narrow issue as outlined in the case of R. v Murtagh and Kennedy reported in 39 Cr. App. Ft. at page 72 and at page 83. In that case there had been a charge of murder and the defence relied on was that of an accident. The convictions were quashed- on the grounds that the jury had not been specifically directed to acquit if the explanation of the defendants left them in any doubt. Justice Hirbery in delivering the Judgment of the Court at page 83 had this to say and I quote:
"Having regard to the evidence it is pre—eminently a case ware it was essential for the judge to make clear to the jury three possible positions in which the jury night find themselves, bearing in mind throughout that it was not for the accused to establish their inocence: that is to say:
(1) If they accepted the explantion of the court ,they must acquit.
(2) Short of accepting that explanation if it left then in doubt they must acquit.
(3) On consideration of the whole of the evidence they must be satisfied of the guilt of the accused of one or other of the crimes alleged against them."
In order to appreciate counsel for the 2nd appellant's submission on this point I need to make references to certain other passages of the summing-up by the learned trial judge. In these passages he directed them as follows, I quotes
"Then perhaps it is left for you to say that this was planted on him. It is left with you to say whether he was saying the truth. That because of his sore leg it was not possible for his to go to the dance. He was not there. You may want to believe that his story is correct................ you may believe his story where he said that another said
no if we take him along he would be able to show where the other calls agues are. If this is the case, than of course it may create a substantial doubt in your minds so far as the third accused is concerned."
Later on in the sunning up he said and again I quote:—
"His defence is that he did not go out at all .He was in bed that is an alibi. He was in bed ha did not go out,Well it is for you to say. that you believe his that he did not go out that night .It is for you to believe his that because of his sore foot ha would not have gone out. If you come to that belief than he is free out of the whole thing he gets out of the whole thing. The defence is short and simple. I did, not go out that is his defence etc."
Put in the briefest form, the question is what her the words used by the learned trial judge in directing the Jury in his summing-up on the question of the burden and standard of proof was a misdirection. He repeatedly used the words "If you believe him" in the passages referred to above and that' if they believed his story this might create a substantial doubt in their minds, so that apart from the judge using the words "if you believe his story" etc. the fact that an accused person is lying doss not necessarily mean that he is guilty or that he may be convicted without more. See the case of Seisay and Siaffa v,R, reported in 1967-1968 African Law Reports (Sierra Leone) Series at page 323. The burden remains in the prosecution to prove the guilt of the prisoner and it is the judge's duty to make this quite clear to the jury and if the prosecution fails the prisoner must be acquitted.
Bearing in mind the passages referred to supra the authorities cited above together with the fact that the learned trial judge had also told the jury that the appellants were relying on their statements it is my considered view that the learned trial judge was shitting the burden of proof on to the shoulders of the 2nd appellant when he told then that if they believed the story of the 2nd appellant they oust set him free. This to me was clearly a misdirection.
The burden of proof still £g&,ta upon the prosecution. Apart from this, after making it clear to the jury upon whoa the burden of proof lies, it is also the learned trial Judge's duty to direct them on the standard of proof that is required in a criminal case. It is my opinion that ha failed to do so. Hie use of the words reasonable doubt, fanciful doubt and substantial doubt referred to in the passages quoted above may have caused a lot of confusion in the minds of the jury. As a matter of fact by using the words substantial doubt ha was, imposing a lower standard of proof on the prosecution. A case is never proved if the summing-up leaves the jury in any doubt. It is stated in Archibold Thirty-Fifth Edition at 361 paragraph 1001 and I quotes:
"That if an explanation is, given by or on behalf of the prisoner which raises in the minds of the Jury a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, he is entitled to be acquitted because if upon the whole of the evidence in the case, the Jury are left in any reasonable state off doubt the prosecution has failed to satisfy the onus of proof which lies upon them."
Finally let me end by saying that a summing-up must not be ambigeous in anyway. As stated supra the jury must be directed, in no uncertain terms upon whom the burden of proof lies and that before they convict they must be satisfied so that they feel sure of the prisoner's guilt; this was the formula often used. See the cases of R. v Kritz (1950) 1 K.B. at page 82 and R. v. Summers (1952) 1 All E.R. at page 1059.
However in 1972 in the case of Mcgreevy v D.P.P. supra the House of Lords stipulated that the proper direction to be given on the standard of proof is that it must be made plain to the jury that they must not convict unless they are satisfied of guilt beyond all reasonable doubt - thus approving the ruling in the House of Lords in the case of Woolmington V D.P.P, supra.
I had stated earlier that it would be convenient for me to deal with the 2nd ground of appeal of the 1st appellant with the 3rd ground of appeal of the 2nd appellant together as they are both similar. The 1st appellant had also relied on his statements which had been tendered in evidence and his complaint as regards this ground of appeal was against the use of the words substantial doubt and fanciful- doubt act . in the summing up. I do not propose to go into detail but will adopt the reasons give and the cases referred to supra on behalf of the 2nd appellant as well. In view of the above .I have therefore come to a clear conclusion under the circumstances that there were fundamental misdirection as well as non-direction contained in the summing up of the learned trail judge to the jury and that he also failed to direct them that whatever view they took of the explanation given by the appellant in their statement and on the whole of the evidence in this case that they must acquit if the explanation given by both appellant left them in any doubt , It therefore follows that their appeal on this particular ground must succeed. On the other hand I find no merit in the other grounds of appeal of both appellant. This Court has been invited by Miss Tejan Julloh to apply the provision of sub-section 2 of sec.58 of the Laws Out 1965
This section states as follows:-
" On an appeal against conviction the Court of Appeal may act not with standing that they are of opinion that the point raised may by decided in favour of the appellant dismiss the appeal if they consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred."
In 1976 a further amendment was made to Sec 58 (2) of the Court Act supra giving the Court of Appeal power to order a new trail as an alternative to dismissing the appeal if they feel that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred which means that the
the position as it is now is that the Court of Appeal may either dismiss the appeal or order a new trial if they are satisfied that ho substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.
However I find myself unable to apply either of these two provisions and say that there was no substantial miscarriage of Justice because in the present circumstances it is impossible to say that the jury would necessarily have come to the same conclusion had they been properly directed; there is clearly a serious misdirection here. and I am also of the opinion that the omission of the judge to direct the Jury adequately may have brought about the verdict..
For the reasons which I have given above, I cannot allow the conviction of both appellants to stand and would allow the appeal and set aside the convictions.
Appeal of both appellants allowed. Convictions quashed, sentences sat aside.
(Hon. Mr. Justice C.A. Harding- Justice of the Supreme Court (Presiding).
(Hon. Mrs. Justice A.V.A. Mwunor-Renner, JS.C.)
(Hon. Mr. Justice O.M Golley, J.A.)