[I] Land Law-joint tenancy-incidents-unity of possession, interest, title and commencement: A joint tenancy is distinguished from a tenancy in common by unity of possession, unity of interest, unity of title and unity of commencement of such title; and therefore where a testator devises property to named children for life but directs that his daughters' interests should cease on marriage, there is no unity of interest between sons and daughters and, notwithstanding the absence in the will of words of severance, all the children named take as tenants in common (page 135, lines ll-20). [2] Land Law-tenancy in common--creation-devise to all children for life with daughters' interests to cease on marriage creates tenancy in common: See [1] above. [3] Succession-wills-construction-joint tenancy and tenancy in common-devise to all children for life with daughters' interests to cease on marriage creates tenancy in common: See [1] above. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant to recover possession of certain properties to which he claimed entitlement under a will. A testator devised certain properties to his sons by one wife 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 and their heirs and his children by another wife. He stipulated 40 that "the whole of his children should have a life interest in the  properties" but that "the right interest and titles of [his] daughters be ceased after their marriage." The plaintiff, the last surviving child of the testator, brought the present proceedings to recover possession of the properties as against the defendant, the daughter of another child of the second-named wife. The Supreme Court was asked to rule on whether the testator's children took as tenants in common or joint tenants. Miss Wright for the plaintiff; 10 Betts for the defendant. SMITH, C.J.: The testator, Zachariah Claudius Roberts, by his will dated April 18th, 1901, made the following devise: 15 "I devise unto my beloved sons, viz: William Charles, Charles James, Alfred Abel and Edmund Tomori, by Mrs. Mary Ann Adufe of Market Street Lagos and their heirs, and my beloved sons and daughters by Mrs. Agnes Henrietta, viz: Richard, Nancy, Francis, Frances and Laura, all my houses situate and 20 lying at Fisher Street in the City of Freetown Sierra Leone with the wharf at Sus an's Bay commonly known as Big Wharf and my house and land situate and lying at Alii Street Faji in the Colony of Lagos. I desire that the whole of the children should have a life interest in the properties so devised and that 25 the right interest and titles of my daughters be ceased after their marriage." The testator then proceeded to devise another property at Market Street, Lagos, to two of his sons and then devised his house and farm at Ebute Metta, Lagos, to his trustees upon trust to sell 30 the same and to deposit the proceeds. He instructed the trustees- "that in case the house and land at Fisher Street with the wharf at Susan's Bay ... need any repairs or improvement the monies or money so deposited should be used for that purpose." The will contained no general residuary devise. The plaintiff 35 is the last surviving child of the testator, being one of Mrs. Henrietta's children, while the defendant is a daughter of Richard, another one of Mrs. Henrietta's children. At this stage of the case I am asked to rule only as to whether the interest devised by the testator to the two groups of children 40 made them tenants in common or joint tenants. In the first place, I note that the devise to the children of Mrs. Adufe is to them and their heirs, while the devise to the children of Mrs. Henrietta is to them simply with no mention of heirs. Secondly, I note that after making the devises to the two groups of children the testator provided: "I desire that the whole of the children should have a life interest in the properties so devised . . . ." Thirdly, after making the devises to the first two groups, the testator proceeded to distinguish a third group, the daughters among them, whose interests should become terminable on marriage. The extent of the estate acquired by the daughters therefore differed from the estates given to the sons. Blackstone says (2 Commentaries, at 180) that a joint tenancy is distinguished by unity of possession, unity of interest, unity of title and unity of the time of the commencement of such title. Under the will the unities of possession, title and time of commencement exist between the three groups, but there is no unity of interest as between the sons and daughters, as the daughters have a lesser estate than the sons. I therefore rule that, notwithstanding the absence of words importing division between the devisees, the estates which they took are tenancies in common and not joint tenancies.

Ruling accordingly.