Respondent was charged in the magistrate's court with dispersing a newspaper without the name and place of abode of the printer on it contrary to section 9 of the Newspapers Ordinance. He was also charged with assisting to disperse

a newspaper without the name and place of abode of the printer on it contrary to the same section. Respondent pleaded not guilty. The case for the prosecution rested on the evidence of a detective constable who testified that he had purchased one copy of the newspaper " The Renascent African " from respondent, that respondent had had other copies for sale and that there was no name or address of the printer on the newspaper. At the close of the case for the prosecution, counsel for respondent submitted that there was no case for him to answer. The magistrate upheld this submission, saying: "In my view it would be straining the meaning of the word ' disperse ' were I to hold that by selling a copy of the paper the accused 'dispersed' the paper or assisted in dispersing the paper .... " When the Attorney-General's appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed, he appealed to the Court of Appeal. Held, (1) that to sell one copy of a newspaper is not to "disperse" the newspaper within the meaning of section 9 of the Newspapers Ordinance; and (2) that the sale of one copy of a newspaper by a person who has other copies available for sale constitutes an attempt to disperse the newspaper. John H. Smythe for the appellant. Row/and E. A. Harding for the respondent. AMES P. This is an appeal by the Attorney-General against a decision of the Supreme Court given in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction and dismissing an appeal by the Attorney-General. The respondent was charged in the magistrate's court with dispersing a newspaper without the name and place of abode of the printer on it contrary to section 9 of the Newspapers Ordinance (Cap. 151, Laws of Sierra Leone, 1946). The particulars of the offence were as follows : "J. C. Lucan on or about the 20th day of August, 1960, at Freetown, in the Police District of Freetown in the Colony of Sierra Leone, dispersed a newspaper entitled 'The Renascent African,' Vol. 5, No. 96, dated July 8, 1960, the said paper not having printed thereon in legible characters the name and usual place of abode or business of the printer of the said newspaper." There was a second and alternative count for assisting to disperse a newspaper without the name and the place of abode of the printer contrary to the same section. The particulars of this count were the same except, of course, that they alleged that he " assisted in dispersing." The material part of section 9 of the Ordinance is as follows: " Every person ... who shall publish or disperse or assist in publishing or dispersing any newspaper on which the name and place of abode of the person printing the same shall not be printed as aforesaid, shall for every copy of such newspaper so printed by him, be liable, on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £5." The respondent pleaded not guilty. The material part of the evidence given for the prosecution was the following evidence of a detective constable: "On August 20 last I saw accused at 4 Fourah Bay Road. It was in a bar portion of the premises. I asked accused whether he has ' Renascent 

rican ' paper for sale and he said yes. I asked for a copy and he picked up a copy of the paper which he handed to me. I paid him 2d. This is the copy of the paper dated July 8, 1960, and Vol. 5, No. 96. I produce it. There were many other copies besides it. There is no name or address of the printer on it." He was cross-examined by counsel for the respondent. Another witness was called from the Registrar General's office to produce the certified return in respect of the registration of the newspaper. The case for the prosecution then closed. Counsel for the respondent submitted that there was no case for the respondent to answer. After hearing argument, the magistrate upheld the submission saying: " . . . To my mind the offence would seem to be committed if the accused took part in distributing copies of the paper. In my view it would be straining the meaning of the word ' disperse ' were I to hold that by selling a copy of the paper the accused ' dispersed ' the paper or assisted in dispersing the paper .... " On appeal to the Supreme Court, the learned judge upheld the ruling and dismissed the appeal. He said in his judgment: " The facts before the learned magistrate were that on August 20, 1960, the respondent sold one copy of a newspaper entitled ' Renascent African,' Vol. 5, No. 96, dated July 8, 1960, to a detective constable, the newspaper not having at the time printed thereon the name and usual place of abode of the printers of the said newspaper, contrary to section 9 of the Newspapers Ordinance Cap. 151. ... " Then after considering the meaning of the word "dispersed," which is not defined in the Ordinance, the learned judge held that to sell one copy of a newspaper is not to disperse it within the meaning of the section. We agree with the learned judge that in the absence of any definition of the word, it must be given its ordinary meaning and in its ordinary meaning " disperse " connotes different directions from a centre, and so in the plural and so more than one. Indeed most words beginning with " dis " postulate at least two aspects of the matter. So also does "distribute," as was so held in Canada in a recent criminal trial there according to the note in "Words and Phrases Judicially Defined" (pocket supplement, 1960, Vol. 2) which Mr. Harding for the respondent put before us. The question there was whether the delivery of a handbill to one person only was a distribution of the handbill. The section does not use the words " Every person who shall sell " but "who shall disperse." So selling is outside the section except when it amounts to dispersing. It seems to us however that the learned judge and the learned magistrate both overlooked part of the evidence. There was not merely evidence of sale of one copy ; there was evidence that it was a public place and that there were many copies for sale of which one was sold. These circumstances indicate that all these copies were being offered for sale and so intended to be sold, in so far as they might find purchasers. They were all intended to be sold and so dispersed. But the intention was not by itself an offence nor was the possession 

of so many copies with intention to disperse them. Nevertheless, in our opinion, it is quite clear that when this one copy was sold the respondent had started to put his intention into effect and was in fact and in law attempting to disperse them. For these reasons, in our opinion, the learned magistrate should have called upon the respondent for a defence to a charge of attempting to disperse the newspapers; and we order that the case be sent back for him to do so.